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ABSTRACT 
 During the Cold War, the United States focused its collective policy acumen on forming 
a competitive, actor-specific strategy to gain advantage over the Soviet Union. The 
fragmentation of the Soviet Union resulted in a multi-polar geopolitical environment lacking a 
near-peer rival for the United States. Overwhelming soft and hard power advantages allowed 
American policy makers to peruse a general, non-actor specific strategy to maintain its 
hegemonic position. However, the meteoric rise of China as a near-peer competitor in East Asia 
has challenged this paradigm. In order to maintain its competitive advantage, or at the very least 
ensure the safety of its geopolitical objectives through encouraging benign competition, U.S. 
strategy needs to evolve in both focus and complexity. It is essential for Spacepower, as a key 
element of national power, to be included in this evolution. In order to do so, this analysis will 
examine Sino-U.S. space relations using neoclassical realism as a baseline methodology. First, 
structural elements of the Sino-U.S. relationship will be modeled in a semi-quantitative game 
theoretical framework, using relative economic and military capabilities as primary independent 
variables. Second, key assumptions will be tested to ensure that this model accurately represents 
the current geopolitical environment. Third, the decision making apparatuses of the United States 
and China will be examined as intervening variables. This will account for imperfect rationality 
and how it modifies the game theoretical framework. Fourth, this framework will be used to 
present actionable space policy recommendations for the United States so that space can be 
incorporated into a competitive strategy for East Asia.
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I. Background 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The rise of China as an economic and military force threatens to upset the status quo of 
American hegemony in East Asia. Although hard power conflict is not a predetermined aspect of 
Sino-U.S. relations, structural factors favor a contentious outcome in the long-term. Therefore, 
the United States must adopt an actor-specific competitive strategy for East Asia that leverages 
all elements of latent national power to pursue consistent, well-defined national objectives. 
Spacepower is an important but often overlooked element of national power that plays a unique 
role in Sino-U.S. relations. Consequently, the focus of this thesis will be how Spacepower may 
be integrated into a broader competitive strategy for East Asia with the goal of producing policy 
recommendations for U.S. space policy. 
B. RELEVANCE TO U.S. POLICY 
On June 17, 2011, four notable academics convened in Toronto to debate the following 
question: will the 21st century belong to China? Niall Ferguson, internationally renowned author 
of history and biography, was accompanied by David Li to argue for the pro. Li is an economics 
professor and member of the Monetary Policy Advisory Committee of the Central Bank of 
China. Debating for the con were Fareed Zakaria, notable journalist and author, as well as Henry 
Kissinger. Kissinger has become a de facto authority on Sino-U.S. relations following his tenure 
as secretary of state under Richard Nixon.1 The premise of their debate would have been far-
                                                 
1 Rudyard Griffiths and Patrick Luciani, Does the 21st Century Belong to China? (Toronto: House of Anansi 
Press, 2011), 3-7. 
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fetched at the end of the Cold War; however, in the quarter century since, this question has 
become paramount to the world’s collective geostrategic planning. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union left the United States as the unquestionable global hegemon at the end of the Cold War. 
However, the subsequent rise of regionally influential actors has resulted in an increasingly 
multipolar geopolitical environment.2 The existential threat that the U.S. faced during the Cold 
War has been replaced by a conglomeration of emerging actors vying for an increasing role in 
their region, with the precipitous economic development of China and its increasing influence in 
East Asia heralding this trend. Although this debate was cordial and well informed, it 
demonstrated the substantial uncertainty that China’s rise has created in global politics. The 
message was clear: there is no clear path forward for the U.S. to accommodate China’s rising 
ambitions. 
During the Cold War, the United States executed a well-designed and competitive strategy 
for counterbalancing the Soviet Union in the wake of World War II.3 The success of this strategy 
can be attributed to the following principles: 
1. Think in the long term. Futurist elements must be integrated into a competitive strategy to 
account for emerging technologies and trends.4 Medium to long term analysis reduces the 
chance that a revolution in military affairs (RMA) will catch a state by surprise, allows 
for a cost-benefit analysis of allocating resources to a current problem or a more pressing 
                                                 
2 Griffiths and Luciani, 62. 
3 Graham Allison. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? (Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin-Harcourt, 2017), 204.  
4 Thomas Mahnken, Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2012), 100. 
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one that is anticipated in the future, and allows for consistency in the face of a dynamic 
political environment.  
2. Ways, ends, and means must be synergistic.5 Individual technologies, tactics, and policies 
should be measured by the effects they produce towards broader strategic goals. 
Likewise, an understanding of broader strategic goals must be considered when 
developing policy for a focused area (such as space).6 Ultimately, the goal of a 
competitive strategy should be a sustainable status quo congruent with the country’s 
interests. 
3. Know thy enemy. Competitors get a vote, therefore a deep understanding of their decision 
making apparatus is required to gauge a move/response/counter-response pattern.7 
Diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and social factors must be understood in 
the context of strategic culture in order to accomplish predictive analysis.8 Forming this 
understanding may be the greatest barrier that the United States faces in developing an 
actor-specific competitive strategy.9 
4. Resource constraints are inevitable. Allocation of resources (such as money, political 
will, time, and existing capabilities) is often the deciding factor in the success of a 
strategy. Inevitably, tradeoffs will need to be made in a way that utilizes a state’s 
strengths to take advantage of a competitor’s weaknesses.10 Conducting a systematic 
                                                 
5 Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 2014), 128. 
6 Thomas Drohan, A New Strategy for Complex Warfare: Combined Effects in East Asia (Amherst: Cambria 
Press, 2016), 12-15. 
7 Mahnken, Competitive Strategy, 95. 
8 Drohan, A New Strategy for Complex Warfare, 8-9. 
9 Mahnken, Competitive Strategy, 24. 
10 Haddick, Fire on the Water, 122. 
 4 
 
analysis of individual strengths and weaknesses is required to implement this aspect of 
strategy and prevent overreach.  
Space policy and national strategy were closely linked during the Cold War, combining soft 
and hard power initiatives in service of clearly defined objectives.11 President Kennedy’s moon 
program was extremely effective in accomplishing its goals because it accounted for every 
element of combined strategy. The president, despite his rhetoric, did not believe in the intrinsic 
value of space travel; rather, he understood that it could be a powerful symbol of America’s 
technological and cultural superiority over the Soviet Union. Kennedy saw the Apollo program 
as an opportunity to win an ideological battle for the hearts and minds of the third world by 
presenting a strong image of progressive anti-colonialism.12 It was aimed at exploiting the 
structural weaknesses in the Soviet system while simultaneously leveraging the productivity of 
the American technocracy.13 Most importantly, Kennedy, Johnson, and Webb exercised 
considerable political acumen to overcome limitations within the American system in order to 
mobilize the requisite national resources to execute their desired strategy.14  
In the years since the Cold War, the United States has largely failed to integrate space policy 
and national strategy. American politicians have tended to focus on replicating Kennedy’s grand 
vision of space travel and mirroring his nationalist rhetoric to score political victories rather than 
focusing on the mechanics of competitive strategy. President Bush’s Space Exploration Initiative 
and the 2004 Bush space vision fell hopelessly short of stated goals while American strategists 
                                                 
11 Joan Johnson-Freese. Space as a Strategic Asset (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 51-81. 
12 Walter McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1985), 303-306. 
13 McDougall, 307-324 
14 John Logsdon, John F. Kennedy and the Race to the Moon (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 119-
142, 235-237. 
 5 
 
became increasingly myopic, concentrating on the tactical military utility of space systems at the 
expense of other aspects of national power.15 The counterproductivity of the U.S. space policy 
can be exemplified with three post-Cold War initiatives: withdrawing from the ABM treaty, 
export control legislation, and space dominance doctrine.16  
American strategic planners during the Cold War had the luxury of operating in a bipolar 
environment where multi-order effects could ultimately be accounted for in the context of the 
U.S.-Soviet balance of power. However, with an increasingly complex geopolitical environment 
in which China is emerging as the United States’ primary competitor and the rest of the world is 
developing parity with American technological capabilities, U.S. strategy must become more 
economical. It is of vital importance that the core tenants of competitive strategy be applied to 
the development of a similarly effective strategy in East Asia.17. This must be accomplished 
while avoiding the common pitfall of fighting the previous war.18 The space domain is a 
microcosm of the broader strategic picture, one that is becoming increasingly complex, with 
more states fielding space capabilities, rapid technological advancements, the rising importance 
of space as an element of national power, and the meteoric rise of China. Therefore, it is 
necessary to reexamine space policy in order to integrate it with a competitive strategy for East 
Asia. 
                                                 
15 Thor Hogan, Mars Wars: The Rise and Fall of the Space Exploration Initiative (Washington: NASA History 
Division, 2007), 159-166. 
16 Johnson-Freese outlines the failures of American space policy since the Cold War in Space as a Strategic 
Asset. These specific programs will be examined at length during subsequent chapters.  
17 Allison, Destined for War, 214-240; Mahnken, Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century, 101-103; Drohan, 
A New Strategy for Complex Warfare, 4-5, 272, 275-278; Haddick, Fire on the Water, 121-138; Henry Kissinger, 
On China (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 534-542. 
18 Mahnken, Competitive Strategy, 15. 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
Neoclassical realism is the best theoretical approach to perform the medium-term predictive 
analysis that competitive strategies require. It acknowledges that structural factors such as 
relative power and geography are the chief independent variables of international relations in the 
long-term, ultimately setting the left and right bounds of state behavior.19 This theory suggests 
that foreign policy is strongly linked to systemic incentives but asserts that those incentives are 
not deterministic.20 Therefore, it accounts for the general trend of conflict that occurs when the 
global status quo is usurped, while avoiding the propensity for structural determinism inherent to 
offensive realism. Neoclassical realism emphasizes that building an understanding of structural 
factors is required as the first step to analyzing international relations, therefore the overarching 
method through which competitive strategy must be developed is by examining external, 
systemic variables impacting Sino-U.S. relations. This thesis will examine the unique geography 
of East Asia, the physics of the space domain, and the relative power dynamic between China 
and the United States as its primary independent variables. 
One of the core tenants of neoclassical realism is the assumption of imperfect rationality. A 
leader’s understanding of structural factors is inevitably refracted as it passes through the lens of 
cultural perception and behavioral economics, and often functions in combination with a lack of 
information about an opponent’s intentions and capabilities. These influences create 
misperceptions about the relative power dynamic, causing leaders to make seemingly irrational 
decisions. As a result, structural factors can only impact states’ behavior to the extent that they 
                                                 
19 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Thories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 151. 
20 Rose, 164. 
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influence the perception and decision making of leaders. This complicates the linear correlation 
between structural factors and state behavior, making a purely realist analysis less accurate over 
the short and medium terms. 21 Therefore, neoclassical realism requires that a state’s decision 
making apparatus must be considered as an intervening variable to account for these factors.22 
Internal factors must be studied in conjunction with external factors to be able to perform a 
comprehensive analysis of state behavior. In order to determine the effects of these intervening 
variables, this thesis will examine the decision making apparatuses of China and the United 
States through an examination of unmotivated and motivated biases that affect the Sino-U.S. 
strategic relationship.  
For foreign policy analysis, a neoclassical realist approach seeks to avoid both a heavily 
quantitative game theoretical analysis or the purely qualitative methods of thick description.23 A 
balance must be struck between the tendencies for game theoretical analysis to devolve into 
structural determinism, or for thick description to become mired in overly-nuanced analysis. A 
non-quantitative, descriptive game theoretical analysis is able to strike this balance. On one hand, 
purely quantitative game theoretical framework used for predictive analysis succumbs to 
exponentially increasing complexity as a greater range of intervening variables is introduced. On 
the other, a simple 2x2 game is often dismissed as being too simplistic to capture the complexity 
of international politics.24 Therefore, a game should be used as a representation of general policy 
                                                 
21 Rose, 158.  
22 Rose, 152. 
23 Rose, 166. 
24 Duncan Snidal, “The Game Theory of International Politics,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 44.  
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stances, one that can be modified to encompass a wide range of phenomena in order to illuminate 
the fundamental nature of a policy issue.25  
The foundation of this analysis will be a basic 2x2 game that seeks to describe the structural 
dynamic of Sino-U.S. relations. Independent variables such as relative military capability and 
economic means will be used to set a reference point for each player, assign utility within the 
function, and establish equilibrium. The game will be then be modified using intervening 
variables, such as motivated and unmotivated biases, in order to anticipate deviations from 
perfect rationality. This method is based off Robert Jervis’s seminal article Cooperation Under 
the Security Dilemma, in which he sets the theoretical groundwork for integrating game theory, 
neoclassical realism, and the security dilemma.26 This analysis will build on Jervis’s framework 
by incorporating actor and domain specific information. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The best fit for a literature review when using a neoclassical realist methodology is a top-
down approach as it requires a solid appreciation of structural incentives before applying them to 
the analysis of a given scenario. Therefore, developing a conceptual understanding of the 
mechanisms of international conflict and how they are modified to account for psychological 
factors is foundational to this thesis. In order to apply this understanding to Sino-U.S. space 
policy the structural variables affecting Sino-U.S. space policy must be examined. These 
includes the geography of the space domain, establishing deterrence in space, its use as an 
instrument of national power, and the broader Sino-U.S. geostrategic balance. Subsequently, 
                                                 
25 Snidal, 37. 
26 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978). 
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assessing intervening psychological variables is based on attaining an understanding of Chinese 
and American security cultures, the perceptions of policy makers about the space and its role in 
strategy, and domestic variables that impact decision making. Finally, integrating space policy 
into the thesis schema requires both a review of existing literature on competitive strategy for 
East Asia and a review of each nations’ space capabilities and policies in an attempt to link the 
two. This will include an analysis of how space capabilities fit into current strategy, how they 
interact with psychological factors, and conclude with a near-term predictive analysis of 
technology and policy development.  
In his 1978 publication Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, Robert Jervis provides an 
excellent analysis of structural and cognitive factors influencing the security dilemma in 
international relations. His fundamental assumption is that international relations exist in a 
condition of anarchy where a state is responsible for its own security absent an international 
sovereign.27 This results in zero-sum relationships where a state’s quest for security impedes the 
security of another. Therefore, when a state seeks to expand its influence in order to increase its 
own security it upsets the existing status quo, making another state less safe.28 He uses a game 
theoretical framework to broadly explain the choices that both states can make, cooperate or 
defect. Both states can defect and the result is conflict; both states can cooperate and reap gains; 
or one can cooperate while the other defects, which results in one state losing big and the other 
winning big. The fear of this third condition is the causal force behind the security dilemma.29  
                                                 
27 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 167. 
28 Jervis, 169-170. 
29 Jervis, 172. 
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Jervis expands the theory by adding the offense-defense postulate which examines the 
circumstances under which the security dilemma is most strong. When technology and 
geography conspire to give an advantage to an attacker, first strikes are incentivized and the 
dilemma becomes stronger.30 Additionally, the security dilemma is heightened when offense is 
not distinguishable from defense because signaling is inherently ambiguous. When both of these 
conditions are met, it creates a doubly dangerous scenario where it is difficult to gain security 
without menacing others. When the opposite condition is true, signaling is effective and a zero-
sum relationship is not exaggerated. This results in a doubly stable relationship with a 
diminished propensity towards the security dilemma. Even when defense has the advantage a 
security dilemma can result when offensive and defensive postures are indistinguishable because 
intentions are difficult to predict.31 
The usefulness of Jervis’s work to this analysis would be limited if he had only accounted for 
structural factors. However, in “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” Jervis briefly 
acknowledges imperfect rationality through the concept of subjective security demands. He 
purports that if every world leader rationally understood her nation’s alignment with this theory, 
conflict would be obsolete.  Therefore, the structural mechanism of the security dilemma is 
dependent on the psychology and perception of national leaders, which alters their calculus of 
the security dilemma.32 Jervis expands this idea in a topical anthology titled Psychology and 
Deterrence. These two works, when taken together, form the basis of a neoclassical realist’s 
analysis of the security dilemma. Case studies involving deterrence failure are used to discern the 
                                                 
30 Jervis, 194. 
31 Jervis, 211-214. 
32 Jervis., 174-176. 
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factors responsible for the underlying miscalculations.33 Three hypothesis are of particular 
interest to this thesis. First, the misperception of the offense-defense balance prior to World War 
I (WWI) contributed to a lack of first-strike stability. Second, culture differences resulting in bad 
signaling were a factor leading to the Falklands War. Third, a miscalculation of an unacceptable 
shift in balance of power created an incentive to launch a preemptive attack preceding the Arab-
Israeli War of 1973.34 
The integration of structural and psychological factors in decision making under the security 
dilemma is accomplished through the application of behavioral economics. Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky set the basis for this understanding in their collected works, the capstone of 
which is Thinking Fast and Slow. Cognitive predispositions, the availability heuristic, and 
motivated biases are all used to explain deterrence failures in Psychology and Deterrence.35 
However, the most relevant of their works is Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk. It explains that the linear correlation between risk and gains in a rational model can be 
modified to account for the propensity of an actor to accept risk based on her satisfaction with 
the status quo. The result is a non-linear relationship between risk and gains. Their model is often 
used to account for psychological variables within a game theoretical framework.36 Kahneman 
and Tversky propose that actors have the tendency to assess their position in relative rather than 
absolute terms, therefore those who are dissatisfied with their relative position are increasingly 
                                                 
33 Robert Jervis, Richard Nebow, and Janice Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1991), 11. 
34 Jack Snyder covers the first case in his chapter “Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914”, Richard 
Lebow examines the origins of the Falklands War in “Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the 
Falklands War”, and Janice Stein looks into the third case in the chapter “Calculation, Miscalculation, and 
Conventional Deterrence: The View From Cairo” 
35 Jervis, Nebow, and Stein, 18-27. 
36 Bonnie Triezenberg, Deterring Space War: An Exploratory Analysis Incorporating Prospect Theory into a 
Game Theoretic Model of Space Warfare (Santa Monica: RAND, 2017),  35-37. 
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likely to accept risk while those who are satisfied become risk averse.37 This dynamic is 
expected to be especially strong between China and the United States where the U.S. represents a 
strong status quo power and China is emerging to challenge America’s position. Assessing 
internal variables for China and the United States can set a reference point for each nation and, 
using prospect theory, perform an analysis of their propensity to accept risk.  
After examining models of international conflict and incorporating them within a theoretical 
framework in order to set the foundation for this thesis methodology, structural dynamics 
underlying the Sino-U.S. space policy relationship must be examined. Because context is 
essential to any niche policy arena, the broader Sino-U.S. geostrategic balance is the primary 
structural dynamic affecting Sino-U.S. space policy. In Destined for War: Can America and 
China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Grahm Allison coins the term Thucydides’s Trap to describe 
the friction caused by a state gaining comparative military, political, and economic power at the 
expense of an existing hegemon. He uses Thucydides examination of this dynamic in History of 
the Peloponnesian War as the basis of his research and examines 15 additional case studies in 
which a rising power has displaced a status quo power.38 By Allison’s own admission the use of 
words like destined or predetermined are misleading. However, he reveals that, “…in all cases 
we find heads of state confronting strategic dilemmas about rivals under conditions of 
uncertainty and chronic stress,”39 and in 12 of 16 cases examined the result has been war 
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between the two states.40 Additional to the zero-sum hard power relationship strongly acting 
upon both actors to strengthen the security dilemma, Allison proposes that psychological factors 
can modify the relationship and serve to either dampen or exacerbate Thucydides’s Trap. 
Generally, a rising power’s recognized status in the international community lags behind that 
state’s self-perceived importance whereas the status quo power faces fear and anxiety in the face 
of potential decline.41 Management of these perceptions is essential to avoiding conflict. 
Allison makes the case that the contemporary Sino-U.S. relationship meets the conditions for 
Thucydides’s trap and analogizes it with the pre-WWI dynamic between Britain and Germany. 
He argues that the rapid expansion (or reemergence) of China’s economy is supporting a 
subsequent increase in military power and political influence in East Asia. This threatens to upset 
the status quo of American hegemony in the region.42 Allison examines China’s national 
motivations and internal decision making apparatus and proposes that the Chinese Communist 
Party’s (CCP) mandate is to return Chinese national prestige and recoup national sovereignty. 
This is supported primarily by a strong nationalist sentiment and continued economic reform.43 
The analysis is useful in that it examines the structural preconditions for conflict, but also 
conducts a layered neoclassical realist analysis by identifying accompanying psychological 
factors and suggesting a way forward to help soften the structural predilection for conflict. These 
actor-specific recommendations may be integrated into a competitive strategy approach to 
increase its efficacy.      
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Robert Haddick’s Fire on the Water is relevant to this thesis in that it combines an 
understanding of East Asian geography, the current state of military technology and doctrine, 
and national motivations to perform a holistic analysis of the Sino-U.S. strategic balance. 
Although China has substantial coastline, it is viewed as a continental power rather than a 
maritime one due to the cramped nature of the South China and East China Seas. A series of 
island chains create a physical barrier that serves to constrain Chinese naval expansion and offers 
the opportunity for hostile nations to stage attacks into mainland China. China’s traditional fear 
of encirclement, its quest for resources, and unresolved national sovereignty creates incentives 
for maritime expansion.44 On the other hand, fear of China’s expanding influence among nations 
along China’s periphery has resulted in rebalancing in order to contain China. Furthermore, 
China’s expanded influence threatens U.S. interest in the region, creating the potential to limit 
access to sea lines of communication and coerce trading partners. This creates a struggle where 
China must demonstrate the capability to deny U.S. military assets access to the area close to 
China’s maritime borders while the U.S. seeks to maintain the ability to project power into the 
region and strike at Chinese strategic interests.   
This dynamic has two important implications for this thesis. Due to the emphasis on systems 
warfare and information systems, the current overall military balance lacks first-strike stability. 
Also, the cost of offensive capabilities is far lower than the capabilities they are designed to 
defeat. American surface ships and 5th generation air assets are orders of magnitude more 
expensive and harder to produce than the Chinese anti-access missiles designed to interdict them. 
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Haddick’s assessment of an offensive dominant condition is bleak considering Jervis’s 
observations about how an environment that favors the offense heightens the security dilemma.  
More importantly, the tyranny of distance has created an overreliance on space assets in East 
Asian military operations. It is clear to see through Haddick’s analysis that space operations and 
terrestrial geography are interrelated. He paints a bleak picture where, in the event of hostilities, 
the area within 2000km of the Chinese mainland would turn into a dead zone where the cost of 
performing military operations is prohibitive aside from limited probing actions.45 The United 
States will likely be deprived of traditional land, sea, and air assets used for performing ISR used 
for targeting mainland China, which greatly reduces the coercive capability of the U.S. military. 
The resulting reliance on space assets to perform these functions increases their value as military 
targets. Likewise, China uses space-based capabilities for targeting U.S. military assets between 
the Chinese mainland and the second island chain. Aided by their continental position, China’s 
space and ground based ISR assets create a redundant architecture with which to threaten U.S. 
assets.46 This creates an asymmetric advantage for China that makes space warfare a possible 
tool of coercion and deterrence. However, for the Chinese, as the theater of operation’s distance 
from the mainland increases their reliance on space assets is proportionally raised. Therefore, 
projecting power beyond the first island chain becomes a difficult proposition without space 
power. Due to the importance of space assets in the East Asian military balance this thesis argues 
that they will likely be considered as first-strike options by both nations.  
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In addition to the links between terrestrial geography and space power, space has a unique 
geography in and of itself. Said geography, defined by orbital mechanics and the relentless pull 
of gravity, must be examined as a fundamental structural component of this analysis. Often times 
policy makers fail to grasp that realities of orbital mechanics and current state of technology 
create a very limited right and left bound of what is possible (or at the very least practical) in 
space. Everett Dolman, author of Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, argues 
that space, counterintuitively, is an operationally limited environment. Due to the exponential 
cost that the rocket equation imposes on lifting objects into orbit, spacefaring nations develop 
narrow, well-trodden pathways to space in an attempt to minimize this cost.47 Launch locations 
and support stations at given latitudes and longitudes are more valuable than others.48 Also, an 
orbit’s characteristics translate to their relative path along the earth’s surface. Therefore, only 
certain combinations of orbital elements produce an orbit that serves a purpose for terrestrial 
support functions. These limiting factors create strategic chokepoints through which the entirety 
of the space domain may be controlled.49 
Dolman uses his assessment of space geography to apply the geopolitical realist lines of 
thinking from Mackinder and Mahan’s to the space domain. It is arguable that his Realpolitik 
thought experiment has had disproportional influence on space strategists, but a useful line of 
thought still comes out of Dolman’s analysis. It is evident that space domination is possible 
given a state with adequate technological prowess and the will to do so. Rather than the cosmos 
being an impossibly large area out of reach of a single hegemon, a state could physically 
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dominate space by controlling the most important chokepoints. These chokepoints may serve as 
flash points for future conflicts because of space’s overall importance to terrestrial conflict.50 
The entire structure of the space law framework set about in the Cold War was not benign, rather 
it was an attempt by Russia and the United States to prevent the domination of space by the other 
power considering their own inability to do so.51 Therefore, with the technological advancements 
since the Cold War and the removal of the primary buffer against U.S. expansion, the prospect of 
the U.S. seeking space domination seems more likely. This effectively extends the “border” 
between the Chinese and Americans and adds another dimension to the already complex 
relationship. This thesis will argue that the geography of space combined with the American 
doctrine of space control exacerbates the Chinese fear of encirclement. 
In Heavenly Ambitions: America’s Quest to Dominate Space, Joan Johnson-Freese argues 
that, despite the impressions of policy makers in both China and the U.S., domination of space is 
currently impractical due to the current technological development of space systems. 
Ideologically, her soft-power driven, innerpolitik analysis of space policy is a counterpoint to 
Dolman. This has won her a similar number of disciples in the space policy realm. Three 
arguments in particular, which are consistent and well developed through her collected works, 
contribute to understanding the structural elements of space policy. First, she believes that 
domination of space is inherently threatening. A space hegemon, unlike one in land, air, or sea 
would inherently have the capability to violate any nations sovereignty with little posturing, at a 
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moment’s notice.52 This would require the placement of space weapons to interdict all objects 
passing through space and be omnipresent in scope and duration.53  
Second, space is an offensive dominant domain. The cost of developing, launching, and 
maintaining a space asset that provides a terrestrial effect is far greater than the corresponding 
technology that can defeat it. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) technologies to include on-orbit interdictors, 
terrestrial based missiles, and electronic jammers are simple, cheap, and efficient, making them 
accessible to nations less capable than top-tier space powers.54 Also, the development time of 
space technologies is far slower than their counter. It is possible to shield on-orbit assets with 
maneuver capability, shielding, or escorts. However, these assets drastically increase the cost of 
maintaining a given effect in a hostile environment. When taken in concert, it is clear from 
Dolman and Freese’s work that space hegemony will take a concerted national effort, requiring 
an expenditure of time, political capital, and money. Also, the window of time between setting 
out to achieve dominance and actually achieving it would be exceptionally vulnerable to a 
security dilemma. Even after achieving dominance a hegemon would need to maintain the 
capability to render an opponent’s ASAT technologies useless, a capability which also falls prey 
to the unfavorable cost relationship of an offensive dominant domain.55  
Third, in the space domain offensive technologies are difficult to distinguish from defensive 
ones. The capabilities that make a good weapon are not mutually exclusive with those that have 
scientific or commercial uses.56 Very few red flag capabilities exist that give an adversary 
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certainty as to the purpose of a given platform. This results in the necessity to either judge an 
adversary by its potential capabilities or take it at face value to be benign. It also results in a 
delicate situation where technology diffusion between commercial entities of one country and the 
commercial or military organization of another has national security implications.57 Even worse, 
the exact same satellite may be used for civilian or military purposes, sometimes at the same 
exact time.58 This complicates the legitimacy of civilian assets as military targets, a line of 
thought reminiscent of the strategic bombing campaigns during WWII. Also, escalation could 
occur if third party assets are being used by one of the belligerents. Therefore, it is evident 
through Freese’s arguments that space is susceptible to Jervis’s doubly dangerous scenario where 
technologies are both offensive dominant and offensive-defense indistinguishable.  
Continuing the thread of integrating theories of international conflict to the space domain, 
Forrest Morgan applies the principles of deterrence to space in his RAND monograph 
Deterrence and First Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment. Morgan’s work 
operates on the theoretical level, using traditional cost imposition/denial of gains structure in 
support of a broad analysis. Generally, the point where perceived cost of executing a strategy 
outweighs the gains reaped from said strategy, deterrence is established. He heavily caveats the 
work, calling it an empty template for further research. Due to deterrence’s subjective nature the 
deterrent effect of a strategy may be strong on one actor but useless for another.59 This 
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foundational analysis can be applied to Sino-U.S. space policy if the relative development of the 
U.S. and China’s space capabilities and strategic culture are accounted for.  
Morgan points out that the nature of space deterrence has fundamentally changed since the 
end of the Cold War. First, a decoupling of space and nuclear warfare has destroyed the tacit red 
lines that guaranteed an attack on space systems would result in nuclear retaliation.60 
Furthermore, technologies have been developed that allow for incremental escalation and non-
lethal functional kills of space assets.61 A paradigm is created where escalation is probable, but 
the extent to which it will happen is unknown. This is a problem for Sino-U.S. space relations 
because China is a nuclear capable power who believes itself to have achieved nuclear deterrence 
with the United States, yet does not have the implied strategic understanding that it took the U.S. 
and the U.S.S.R. four decades to build. The rules of the game have changed, but the danger of 
nuclear apocalypse is still real and a risk of miscalculation has increased. 
 Morgan echoes Johnson-Freese’s assertion that the dual-use phenomenon complicates 
deterrence and extends the reasoning on offensive dominance by adding valuable insight on the 
state of first-strike stability. In short, first-strike stability is difficult to maintain because the   
disproportionate gain from a first strike outweighs any cost a recipient can impose in response. 
The United States’ overwhelming reliance on and comparative advantage from space based 
effects gives a prospective attacker very high payoff and satellites being relatively soft targets 
increases the likelihood of success and further adds to the benefit of a first-strike.62 Conversely, 
the emphasis on system based warfare means that an effective attack on space assets drastically 
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reduces the ability of the U.S. to impose costs. Also, its overreliance on space and the fragility of 
the space environment require an asymmetric response to both avoid a tit-for-tat spiral and 
protect the continued use of the domain. Furthermore, a lack of space situational awareness 
(SSA) prevents a rapid response.63 Chinese military planners are acutely aware of the 
asymmetric advantage to be gained from a first-strike in space and have integrated it into 
military doctrine. This further strengthens the argument of space warfare as a flash point in East 
Asia.  
The structural factors examined in the literature thus far paint a bleak picture for a peaceful 
restructuring of East Asia. However, a bipartisan grand strategy that preempts conflict, is 
sustained and refined over decades, and has an acute sense of both a competitor and one’s own 
culture and history may be able to subvert structural determinism.64 When imperfect rationality 
and miscalculation results in deterrence failure it is difficult to underestimate the importance of 
understanding a competitor’s decision making apparatus. Strategic culture, political climate, and 
soft power interactions are the core of this apparatus. Joan Johnson-Freese, who is equal parts 
East Asia policy and space policy expert, asserts that, “it might be generally possible to grasp the 
mechanics of the Chinese space program without the benefits of historical information, but the 
likelihood of truly understanding the policy aspects without this contextual information is 
slightly less, and attempts at analysis and extrapolation become superficial at best.”65 Likewise, 
competitive strategy will be ineffective absent an understanding of one’s own limitations. 
Resources such as latent military capacity, budget, political capitol, strategic culture, and soft 
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power/international prestige should be easy to calculate, but many times within the space 
program’s short history the failure to grasp internal limitations has been a stumbling block.  
Henry Kissinger’s On China is a nuanced examination of Chinese strategic culture that 
benefits from the author’s understanding of Chinese history and the nation’s role in late-
20th/early-21st century global power politics. He conveys a unified message through On China, 
that continual diplomatic engagement between the two powers is the key to peace and develops 
two motifs throughout the work. First, misapprehension of Chinese intent by western powers has 
repeatedly resulted in conflict, which could be avoided with better understanding of Chinese 
strategic culture. Traditional Chinese strategic culture, shaped for millennia by geography and 
Confucian principals, was not destroyed by Mao and the communist revolution as many assert. 
Kissinger uses the traditional martial games of wei qi (go) and chess to exemplify Chinese and 
western strategic cultures respectively.  Where wei qi teaches the art of strategic flexibility by 
emphasizing encirclement, protracted and asymmetric warfare, generating unperceptively small 
advantages, and momentum; chess teaches total victory achieved by attrition, decisive moves, 
centers of gravity, and symmetry. Carl von Clausewitz teaches that war is policy by other means, 
inferring war as a distinct phase of politics; while Sun Tsu emphasizes victory before fighting by 
achieving psychological advantage with military means as a small part of overall strategy. The 
ideal Chinese military conflict is geographically limited and easily contained; the American way 
of war concludes only upon total victory.66   
Kissinger then describes the feedback loop that results from conflicting strategic 
perspectives. The western desire for control threatens Chinese freedom of maneuver and 
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exacerbates their siege mentality. In response, China assumes a policy of active defense 
(preemption) in order to maintain the strategic initiative. This, in turn, is seen as hostile by the 
west and typically results in escalation in order to establish deterrence through cost imposition. 
The western idea of deterrence is incompatible with ambiguity and flexibility while Chinese 
preemption demands it.67 This results in a distinguishable pattern. First, a state consolidates 
power on China’s periphery, surrounding China and threatening its structural integrity on both 
physical and psychological levels. Second, ever aware of shi, Chinese strategists employ 
measures to maintain their strategic flexibility and prevent total encirclement. Third, the 
peripheral power misinterprets preemption for aggression and escalates the conflict. At this 
point, China is either able to contain the threat and achieve its geopolitical aims or it is too weak 
to do so and is thrown into existential crisis. In the 20th century, this pattern has been 
exemplified by Chinese involvement in the Korean War and its continued support of an 
independent state to buffer the U.S. alliance bloc from a historical ingress point to the Chinese 
mainland; its own Vietnam War to prevent the emergence of a competitive power bloc led by 
Vietnam in Southeast Asia; and Chinese political maneuvering against the Soviet Union to 
prevent its consolidation of power over the Eurasian landmass. Disregarding the similarities 
between these disputes and the current Sino-U.S. position in East Asia is impossible.68 
Second, the Sino-centric worldview is rising in China as she emerges from a century of 
humiliation to become an economic and military superpower. The over-proselytized American 
belief that the implementation of democracy should be the end goal of global politics and 
unapologetically moralist positions conflict with Sino-centrism. It is seen by China as an 
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extension of colonial interventionism and a threat to their fiercely held autonomy. U.S. 
diplomacy is often contingent on the improvement of China’s human rights record. Widespread 
support for China’s various separatist movements and public outcry over the Tiananmen Square 
incident has exacerbated this problem. American reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of a 
communist government, give up democratization as long term policy goals, or give China its due 
in international relations has weakened Sino-U.S. relations. America’s moralist rather than 
pragmatic approach to policy threatens China’s delicate social order and undermines CCP 
legitimacy, resulting in missed diplomatic opportunities.  
Other policy analysts are certainly influenced by Kissinger, but add their own insight into 
Chinese Strategic culture. Kenneth Johnson and Andrew Scobell writing for the Strategic Studies 
Institute both attribute the apparent cognitive dissonance in Chinese policy to a curious blend of 
Confucian ideals and realpolitik thought, supporting Kissinger’s assertion that Confucianism is 
not dead. There is a cult of defense within China, accompanying a deeply held belief that China’s 
strategic culture is overwhelmingly pacifist.69 However, preemptive action is permissible as long 
as it can be a justifiable “defense” of Chinese strategic interests.70 In addition, China bemoans 
aggressive territorial expansion and hegemony by force. This historical sensitivity has only been 
exacerbated by the “century of humiliation” at the hands of European powers.71 However, the 
benevolent expansion of influence and the use of force for Chinese national unification is just. 
Furthermore, the Chinese fear of encirclement could cause a disproportionate reaction to the U.S. 
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force realignment and restructuring of alliances in East Asia.72 This could exacerbate the 
worsening of the security dilemma that alliance forming typically causes.  
Joan-Johnson Freese emphasizes the influence of Confucianism in internal decision making 
and the penchant for isolationism. Confucianism emphasizes peace, order, and knowing one’s 
place within society. This invites authoritarianism and the Chinese people have little experience 
with participation in the political process. Rather, there is an instability lurking beneath the calm 
surface of society that leaders must constrain and satisfy in order to maintain their mandate to 
rule.73 The social contract has a simple results based nature where political stability and 
prosperity is exchanged for the continued political power. The Chinese Communist Party then is 
less beholden to communist ideology than it is to continued prosperity.74 Also, despite the 
negative connotation of nepotism in the West, it is an institution of Chinese culture (known as 
Guan Xi).75 From the outsider, the familial ties, importance of relationships, 
compartmentalization, and ambiguity in the Chinese bureaucracy are confusing and frustrating.  
This research paints the picture of the U.S. and China as diametrically opposed cultures 
that are almost designed to create misunderstanding between the two. Therefore, being aware of 
cultural and political sensitives is necessary to create sound strategy. Michael Pillsbury identifies 
16 psycho-cultural pressure points where, if correctly considered in reassurance, cost imposition, 
or dissuasion strategies, will yield disproportionately effects whether they be positive or 
negative. Each of these factors are referred to as “fears”.76 Eleven of the sixteen fears are linked 
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to the ability of the U.S. military to project power into East Asia and the strategic sea lines of 
communication from the Strait of Malacca to the Bohai Gulf, which is contingent on the ability 
to deliver space effects in support of U.S. military operation. Pillsbury identifies the fear of 
attack on their anti-satellite capabilities as a specific Chinese fear, but warfighting in the space 
domain is intrinsically linked to the other 11. Another of the sixteen fears is the fear of escalation 
and loss of control. This is particularly important because the Chinese view ASAT weaponry as a 
legitimate cost imposition option designed to limit conflict. Contrast that with the American 
strategy of threatening escalation in order to prevent the spread of the conflict into space and 
implicit red lines that fail to account for limited conflict in a strategic domain. Space’s role in 
soft power links it to two final fears, the fear of regional competitors and the fear of internal 
instability. Space technology development is essential to the CCP’s techno-nationalist narrative 
as it is assigned great importance internally to strengthen CCP’s mandate to rule and externally 
to legitimize China as a regional leader.  
According to Sun Tzu, “if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the 
result of a hundred battles.”77 While studying a competitor’s strategic culture is useful to avoid 
mirroring; understanding one’s own strategic culture is vital to effectively utilizing national 
resources and avoiding bias.78 This thesis benefits from being able to perform a thick analysis of 
American strategic culture using a panoply of English language sources. Russell Howard 
describes American strategic culture as that of a traditional sea power with moralistic overtones. 
The American military is highly constrained by legal and moral considerations, meaning that in 
order for the U.S. to enter a war there must be an existential threat to its national security or a 
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crusade of good versus evil.79 This results in national mobilization so that the U.S. can “bear the 
burden of a long twilight struggle against the common enemies of man,” to borrow from John F 
Kennedy’s inaugural address.80 America’s history is punctuated with these struggles from the 
Civil War to WWII. This ideology has become more prominent since the Vietnam War, which 
entrenched the view that, “when America uses force in the world, the cause must be just, the goal 
must be clear, and the victory must be overwhelming.”81 Max Boot in his three books provides 
excellent analysis of how the global wars of the 20th century, the rise of technology, and casualty 
aversion has impacted American strategic thought in the 21st century.82  
American space power doctrine has shown itself to be a microcosm of its strategic culture 
rather than an exception to it. In his influential work, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political 
History of the Space Age, Walter McDougall asserts that the space age did not usher in a new era 
of cooperation, nor was it disconnected from the geopolitical mechanisms of earth-bound policy. 
Rather, it simply extended business as usual to a new realm.83 The American technocracy that 
the genesis of the space age solidified and the international legal framework that U.S.-Soviet 
competition created persist in the 21st century.  
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Eisenhower was surely right-the American system was not set up for central planning, 
nor did its values condone it. But JFK was also right-the old invisible hand was no longer 
equal to the foreign challenge in the age of technological revolution. In the end, the 
United States got the worst of both worlds: a free market twisted at every turn by state 
intervention and a technocratic state incapable of managing the change it provoked.84 
John Logsdon chronicles the Cold War space program in two fantastic works, John F. Kennedy 
and the Race to the Moon and After Apollo: Richard Nixon and the American Space Program, 
which echo McDougall’s assertions. When examining recent space policy decisions it is easy to 
see influences of both American strategic culture and vestiges of Cold War policy, not all of 
which are conducive to the current geopolitical realities.   
 Sino-U.S. space relations is a niche policy community that has gained relevance as a 
result of China’s military transformation and its expanded influence in East Asia combined with 
a series of key U.S. policy decisions such as the withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty, International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) reform following the 1999 Cox 
Report, and U.S. Air Force doctrine published during the Bush administration. In particular, the 
2007 Chinese kinetic ASAT test that destroyed a defunct weather satellite spawned new interest 
in the topic. There are fewer than a dozen strategic thinkers that have a disproportionate voice in 
this community and their tireless analysis can be coalesced into a few common themes.85 First, 
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strategists from both sides see space as a major component of future conflict, including an anti-
access/ area denial (A2/AD) campaign in East Asia. Next, space operations are disturbing the 
equilibrium of strategic deterrence. Finally, the rapid growth of the space industry in China is 
expediting development of a Chinese technocracy. 
 Much of the literature on Sino-U.S. space policy focuses on the war fighting domain. The 
Chinese Direct Ascent ASAT test in 2007 spawned a significant amount of literature pertaining 
to China’s military space strategy and capabilities, particularly focused on how it could threatens 
to disrupt U.S. space superiority in an East Asian conflict. A short, but insightful peace by Larry 
Wortzel links space warfare with Chinese national sovereignty. He contends that U.S. space 
domination threatens Chinese sovereignty because it can be used by the U.S. to project power 
into East Asia and interfere with Chinese affairs.86 Also, the ill-defined legal régime for space is 
commonly viewed as an opportunity for the U.S. to extend its national sovereignty into the space 
domain at the expense of China.87 Ashley Tellis, in a journal article titled China’s Military Space 
Strategy, emphasizes that China’s military space capabilities are not aimed at gaining superiority 
in space. Rather, they are focused on blunting hegemonic and unilateral action by the United 
States to establish space dominance.88 Because Beijing recognizes the comparative advantage 
that asymmetric counterspace weapons give its military, a legal regime limiting these capabilities 
is improbable.89 In The Chinese Vision of Space Military Operations Kevin Pollpeter conducts a 
thorough analysis of Chinese perspectives on space warfare from primary sources. He agrees 
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with Tellis that the Chinese military is primarily concerned with preventing U.S. dominance, but 
emphasizes that offensive weapons and first-strike tactics are at the forefront of Chinese 
strategy.90 Also, Pollpeter emphasizes that the PLA does not have parity with U.S. military space 
capabilities, but is undergoing a concerted effort to eliminate this disparity.91 Two resources are 
particularly important for assessing comparative capabilities. First is the 2017 RAND report The 
U.S-China Military Scorecard. This assesses the general threat to capabilities that each side 
poses to the other and accounts for the tyranny of distance by comparing a Taiwan conflict close 
to the Chinese mainland with a prospective conflict in the Spratly Islands.92 Second, Michael 
Pillsbury examines specific Chinese capabilities against American space targets in his 2007 
report to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.  
 Around the same time as the 2007 Chinese ASAT test another strain of literature started 
growing out of the space policy community that generally describes the changing nature of Sino-
U.S. deterrence. It is a response to the Bush Administration National Space Policy (NSP), the 
U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and Chinese pushback against 
these two events. Sitting atop the pantheon of this literature is The Paradox of Power: Sino-
American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability by David Gompert and Phillip Saunders. 
They argue that the integration of space capabilities into the U.S. national economy and military 
operations has elevated it to a strategic domain, on par with nuclear weapons in their ability to 
strike at core national interests. Unfortunately, the offensive dominance of the space domain 
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makes it difficult to deny gains while the asymmetric dependence on space reduces the 
effectiveness of symmetric cost imposing strategies. In addition to the rather straightforward 
application of Jervis the authors add two valuable insights. First, China has little fear of 
escalation into the nuclear domain due to strategic decoupling between space/conventional 
warfare and nuclear warfare. Second, the monetary and human cost of space warfare is far less 
than that of nuclear weapons or even conventional warfare.93 This means that ASAT weapons 
have become a credible method of strategic deterrence in addition to a powerful conventional 
warfighting tool. Two separate reports were commissioned to examine how space has changed 
the nature of Sino-U.S. deterrence and generally agree with Gompert and Saunders.94 Another 
important thematic element of the “deterrence revisited” literature is the Chinese fear that U.S. 
space control and potential weaponization could endanger its strategic nuclear deterrent 
capability. This subsequently jeopardizes Chinese territorial integrity by making it susceptible to 
nuclear blackmail.95 From this literature it is clear that space has a very different purpose for 
strategic deterrence in the minds of Chinese and American strategists.  
  The successes of the Shenzhou and Tiangong manned space programs and stated 
ambitions for deep space exploration spawned another strain of literature focused on the 
technocratic aims of the Chinese space program. Two works in particular stand out, The New 
Space Race: China vs. the United States by Erik Seedhouse and Asia’s Space Race: National 
Motivations, Regional Rivalries and International Risks by James Clay-Moltz. Manned related 
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and scientific space programs have little direct utility for national security and relatively small 
return on investment in and of themselves, but still factor into Chinese assessment of 
comprehensive national power. Seedhouse believes that the pursuit of a manned space program 
is a demonstration of China’s rising technological prowess and self-sufficiency. The program is 
designed to reap soft power/prestige benefits and position China as a leader in Asia.96 Moltz 
echoes Seedhouse’s position on motivations, but makes a solid case that China’s technocratic 
demonstration is more for the benefit of other Asian nations rather than the United States. The 
Asian nations are closely monitoring the gains of their competitors and competing for relative 
rather than absolute gains.97 Within China, the space program is being used to promote large-
scale educational, economic, and social development as well as enhance the CCP mandate.98 One 
of Moltz’s students provides a fantastic analysis of how the Chinese space program is being used 
to reap soft power benefits. He agrees with the assertion that China is occupying an underserved 
niche by assisting/subsidizing developing nations’ space programs in order to increase national 
prestige without triggering counterbalancing actions.99 The use of space for political and 
diplomatic means makes it a powerful tool for the CCP as their capabilities grow. Therefore, 
space policy could serve as an opportunity to foster cooperation and communication between 
China, the U.S., and other Asian nations. However, as space becomes intertwined with Chinese 
national identity the threat that U.S. capabilities present grows proportionally. 
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E. ROADMAP 
Chapter II will form the basis of a game theoretical analysis using purely structural variables 
(relative economic and military power). First, simplifying assumptions will be outlined. Next, 
utility will be assigned to each of the four outcomes possible in a 2x2 game by examining the 
space programs of China and the United States in the context of the broader strategic 
relationship. Then, the validity of the zero-sum assumption will be tested by exploring 
technology, geography, and economic factors at play in the space domain. Chapter III assesses 
the cognitive biases present in China and the United States’ decision making apparatuses in order 
to ascertain how utility may be altered by perception. The analysis will focus on how 
unmotivated biases affect decision making under risk using prospect theory. Motivated biases 
will be accounted for by examining the strategic cultures of both players. Chapter IV will 
perform a short-medium term predictive analysis and present policy recommendations based on 
the analysis in chapters II and III. 
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II. Modeling for Structural Factors 
A. Building the Game 
Chapter II will seek to describe the structural factors underlying Sino-U.S. relations using a 
realist framework. This framework is highly compatible with game theory and allows for a 
variety of simplifying assumptions when building a model of Sino-U.S. space relations.100 The 
first assumption is that the world order exists in a state of anarchy, precluding the existence of an 
international sovereign who may put bounds on state behavior.101 Therefore, a state is assumed 
to be unrestricted by the expectations placed on it by tertiary actors within the international 
system. Second, the model assumes perfect rationality, under which each actor has perfect 
information and will choose the course of action that maximizes their own utility.102 Third, it is 
assumed that global utility is constant (zero-sum), resulting in a condition where one player’s 
utility can only be increased at the expense of another. In international relations, this zero-sum 
relationship occurs when one state’s security may only be increased by consequently decreasing 
the security of another. Since states often seek to control areas outside their own borders for both 
offensive and defensive reasons, the zero-sum assumption is independent of the power/security 
seeking dichotomy of offensive and defensive realism.103 Regardless of intentions, this 
expansion of responsibilities, commitments, and military power may inherently threaten others. 
Finally, the game will initially be represented as simultaneous and non-iterative. 
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The simple 2x2 matrix used in this analysis is represented in Figure 1.  
  China 
  C D 
U.S. 
C CC CD 
D CD DD 
Figure 1: Simple 2x2 Game Matrix 
“C” represents each player’s choice to cooperate, which may include a reduction in offensive 
weapons, treaties, or assuming defensive posture. D represents each player’s choice to defect, 
which may include the buildup of offensive weapons, assuming hostile posture, or taking hostile 
actions. When both players choose to cooperate (CC), potential gains may be wrought, but when 
both players choose to defect, excessive arms buildup and war may result in loss by both players. 
The third possible outcome is when one player cooperates while the other defects (CD). In this 
scenario, the player that defects can reap significant benefits while the player that cooperates 
stands to suffer substantial loses. The ordinal preference of each player can be shown in Figure 2. 
“x” represents the preference order of the U.S. and “y” represents the preference order of China  
  China 
  C D 
U.S. 
C x,y x,y 
D x,y x,y 
Figure 2: 2x2 matrix with ordinal preferences. U.S. preferences are represented by “x” and 
Chinese preferences are represented by “y”. 
 The magnitude of these preferences may also be quantified to show the utility the players 
experience given each outcome (CC, CD, DC, DD). Chapter II will examine each outcome 
sequentially and determine the utility that the players derive from each one. 
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B. Defining Preferences  
In short, space control is the act of securing the space medium for the purpose of providing 
freedom of access to space and freedom of action in space, while simultaneously denying the 
enemy access to the medium.104 This can be accomplished through kinetic or non-kinetic means, 
by on-orbit or terrestrial assets, and may act on any part of the space system. In order to maintain 
access to space, a state must have a functioning space support system. Space support is the 
ability to sustain satellites and their capabilities on-orbit through day-to-day management and 
field new systems when required.105 Although much has been written about space support and 
space control, it is essential to realize that they are simply a vehicle by which to provide 
terrestrial effects from space. In a military sense, force enhancement is the mission of space 
systems to increase the effectiveness of terrestrial military operations, while force application is 
the ability to impose kinetic and non-kinetic measure from space in pursuit of joint combat 
objectives.106 From a policy perspective, space control and space support must not be viewed in 
isolation; rather, they should be viewed through the lens of the force enhancement mission that 
they support. 
Fundamentally, cooperation between the U.S. and China is based on maintaining the status 
quo of free access to space in accordance with existing international treaties and customary law. 
The primary laws governing the peaceful use of outer space, for which China and the U.S. are 
both signatories, include the Outer Space Treaty (OST), Rescue Agreement, Liability 
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Convention, and Registration Convention.107 Article IV of the OST prohibits the placement of 
nuclear weapons in orbit and forbids the placement of any weapons on a celestial body. Although 
the OST requires the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, it does not prohibit 
conventional weapons in space or provide a definition for what could be considered a space 
weapon. The vagueness of the OST, particularly article IV, amounts to a crisis in space law and 
will be covered at length in later sections.108 Despite the previously mentioned ambiguity, this 
analysis will assume that cooperation entails both the adherence to existing legal regimes and the 
limitation of the capability to wage war in and from the space domain.109 This includes limiting 
space control and on-orbit force application capabilities. Alternatively, defection between the 
U.S. and China involves preventing free access to space through the manipulation of 
international law, the building and maintaining of space control capabilities, or the building and 
maintaining of on-orbit force application capabilities. These broad definitions are essential for 
two reasons: first, they acknowledge that the Sino-U.S. space policy game is nested inside a 
larger game of Sino-U.S. geostrategic relations, given that space power is a fundamental element 
of national power. Second, it accounts for the practical limitations in foundational, codified space 
law. 
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a. Cooperate/Cooperate 
China is highly incentivized by the prospects of mutual cooperation in space. Maintaining 
free access to space is analogous to free sea lines of communication, which are primarily 
guaranteed by U.S. military power.110 This guarantee has allowed China to become the world’s 
largest importer and exporter, accumulating $4.3T of total trade in 2014 and catalyzing a massive 
economic resurgence.111 Similarly, there is evidence that China aims to take advantage of free 
access to space to continue its national rejuvenation into post-industrial future. In 2013, General 
Secretary Xi Jinping announced the “China Dream” to rejuvenate China by building national 
pride, engineering an economic revolution, and rebuilding China’s military.112 Xi has linked a 
“space dream” as a means of fulfilling the “China Dream”.113 After the launch of the manned 
Shenzhou-10 mission in 2013 he stated, “The space dream is part of the dream to make China 
stronger. With the development of space programs, the Chinese people will take bigger strides to 
explore further into space,” and went on to compare the Chinese manned space program to the 
Long March.114 Similarly, Lt. Gen. Zhang Yulin stated, “The earth-moon space will be 
strategically important for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”115 The connection 
between China’s space program and national rejuvenation touted by CCP leaders is particularly 
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strong in relation to the manned space program, which has ambitious development milestones 
planned until 2045.116  
Space power and manned space accomplishments serve to benefit China in five ways. 
First, success in space forms a nationalist narrative and creates a positive focal point for national 
pride, counter to the negative images of the Tianamen Square massacre and China’s consistently 
poor human rights record.117 Maintaining an independent and self-reliant space program helps 
the CCP craft a narrative based on technological development, social progress, and sustainable 
development. This lends legitimacy to CCP leadership of China and stokes nationalism.118 
Additionally, the dissemination and control of satellite communication gives the CCP a medium 
by which to propagate its own political interpretation of world events.119  
Second, the economic benefit gained from China’s space program is essential to 
upholding the informal social contract between the Chinese people and the CCP, one that is 
based on continued economic growth and an increase in quality of life. China seeks to make its 
space program a driver of economic and technological advancement in a variety of ways. 
Primarily, they believe that spin-off technologies from the space program could have up to a 1:10 
cost to benefit ratio.120 This creates a cycle where the Chinese space program generates 
technology, technology spurs economic development, and economic development supports the 
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space program.121 The export of commercial space services will be a driver of economic 
development as a producer of both jobs and hard currency.122 Additionally, the space industry 
spurs the development of a high technology industry by creating a market for high-skill labor and 
products.123 The industrial and academic base required for the development of a strong space 
program is projected to have multi-order effects across other key industries and inspire young 
Chinese to pursue a career in the sciences.124 Next, the use of satellite application technologies is 
critical to China’s economic development.125 The use of geological, weather, and positional data 
is essential to developing China’s limited resources and guarding her fragile environment.126 A 
multitrillion-dollar infrastructure project called the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) was 
announced by Xi in 2013. The purpose of this project is to harness latent Chinese industrial 
capacity to enhance strategic connection between China and the rest of the Eurasian landmass.127 
China’s space development has been specifically linked to BRI by the China National Space 
Administration’s (CNSA) director of international cooperation, Jiang Hui. In a brief to the 
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), Hui highlighted a long term plan 
focused on building the Chinese space industry and leveraging space capabilities (particularly 
geospatial, communication, and navigation systems) to build a spatial information corridor.128  
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Third, China is using spacepower as a way to develop prestige and reap soft power gains. 
The success of the Chinese space program infers significant leadership connotation in the region 
and is intended to establish Beijing at the forefront of Asia’s technology and economic 
development.129 Orbital accomplishments and space technology development is seen as a herald 
for advancement in agriculture, resource management, communications, and disaster 
management as well as a symbol of national scientific and economic infrastructures. Therefore, 
they play a deeply symbolic role in Asia, with significant prestige to be gained by accomplishing 
space “firsts” within the region.130 Beijing has made an effort to translate the success of its space 
program for the purposes of seizing regional leadership, boosting soft power, and incorporating 
space into BRI.131 It created the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) in 2008, 
which consists of China, Iran, Mongolia, Peru, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, and 
Thailand.132 China has donated ground systems, personnel training, and remote sensing data to 
member countries.133 Two other major Asian space cooperation organizations exist: the Japanese 
created and led Asian-Pacific Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) and the Indian created and led 
Center for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP).134 The 
purpose of these organizations is to reduce the costs of expensive space programs through 
resource pooling and increasing diplomatic ties between partner nations. Unfortunately, member 
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nation overlap is mostly limited to smaller countries, and the presence of three competing 
organizations in the same region, each with similar missions led by separate space powers, may 
result in factionalism rather than cooperation.135 
In addition to strengthening China economically, the export of commercial space services 
and the use of satellite application technologies may also have far reaching diplomatic benefits. 
China has served as an eager provider of space services and technologies to international 
markets, particularly for developing countries.136 Providing low-cost, partially subsidized space 
services to developing nations is a powerful diplomatic initiative relating to resource extraction 
and basing rights.137 China provided Brazil a low-cost alternative to the LANDSAT remote 
sensing data via a cooperative venture called Chinese-Brazilian Earth Resources Satellite 
(CBERS). The cost was split 70/30 by China and Brazil.138 China manufactured, launched, and 
operated communications and imaging satellites for oil rich Venezuela.139 Similarly, China 
generously subsidized Nigeria’s first communications satellite for $550M as part of the BRI, 
with Nigerian oil rights serving as collateral.140 Bolivia enjoyed a similar arrangement, as 85% of 
its first communications satellite was subsidized by loans from China and built by the Great Wall 
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Industry Corporation.141 Likewise, China designed, launched, and heavily subsidized a Pakistani 
geosynchronous communication satellite under BRI in exchange for Beidou ground stations in 
Karachi and Lahore.142 This was followed by the development and launch of a remote sensing 
satellite in 2018.143 These acts of space diplomacy are consistent with China’s larger foreign 
policy efforts to open international markets.144 
Fourth, the Chinese space program sets the groundwork for scientific and economic 
exchange between China and Europe. Since the 1960s, Europe has sought independence from the 
U.S. space industry. Aside from the general predilection to maintain sovereignty, this desire has 
been amplified by a series of heavy handed U.S. space policy decisions. During the acquisition 
and early assembly of the space station throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Europeans were 
frustrated with the partnership with the U.S. Rapidly changing requirements and budget cuts 
gave them reason to enter negotiations with less than full faith in U.S. commitments. The nature 
of this partnership made Europeans feel as though they were being treated as a subcontractor 
rather than a full partner, and constantly proliferating Department of Defense (DoD) 
requirements served as an early example of Pentagon influence in civilian space.145 The Gulf 
War and the subsequent emphasis on space as a military technology in U.S. policy led Europe to 
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grow weary of U.S. shutter control for commercial assets and selective service for government 
owned utilities.146 Likewise, the Cox report and corresponding restrictive export control 
initiatives (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulation (EAR) in the early 2000s caused 
backlash in Europe, creating a demand for export-control-free products and leading Europe to 
seek non-U.S. markets for its space technology.147 Wariness of U.S. restrictions created a mutual 
desire for ITAR-free products. Europe primarily seeks to gain a market for high technology 
products while China seeks training and scientific exchange.148 These desires drive Sino-E.U. 
cooperation and set the foundation for China’s science and technology diplomacy to Europe.149 
In the past decade, increasing parity between U.S. and “rest-of-world” technologies has made 
ITAR free products more feasible.150 
Fifth, the opportunity cost of the perpetual “guns verses butter” debate applies to the 
space domain as well. For example, the U.S. military’s space budget is over $12 billion 
(unclassified spending) while NASA’s projected FY2019 budget is $21 billion.151 A system of 
mutual restraint would have the benefit of potentially freeing up billions of dollars from the 
military space budget to dedicate to civilian space spending. Although military space spending 
would remain high, a significant amount of money could be cut from space control spending 
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($2B), reducing the cost of existing military space projects due to loosened requirements on 
survivability, redundancy, and maneuverability.152 Although China’s government spending is 
opaque, rough estimates are available. As of 2017, the U.S. spends approximately $610B (3.1% 
of GDP) annually on defense while China spends only $228B (1.9% of GDP).153 In terms of 
purchase power parity (PPP), China’s actual budget doubles to $434B.154 Likewise, China’s 
$3.5B space budget appears to be dwarfed by U.S. space spending. However, when % of GDP 
and PPP are taken into account, China appears to be much more competitive with the U.S. in 
terms of space budget.155 Therefore, it is expected that China will reap similar budgetary benefits 
from a system of mutual restraint. This adds an even stronger incentive for both nations to 
cooperate. 
In an absolute sense, the benefits of free access to space and the ability to pursue robust 
commercial utilization gives the impression of a strong desire for mutual cooperation. However, 
the zero-sum relationship should not be overlooked. The market for space technology is both 
limited and competitive, meaning that free access to space and the development of the space 
industry free from tariff or political restriction benefits China significantly, to the extent that it 
can increase relative market share in the $320 billion space economy.156 Moving beyond 
competition within the space industry, the relative gain that the U.S. and China each derive from 
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the utilization of space modifies the magnitude of preference for mutual cooperation. For 
example, if China gains X from a system of mutual cooperation while the U.S. gains X + 15, 
then the magnitude of China’s preference for this outcome must be proportionally lower than that 
of the U.S. Although the multi-order effects of the space industry are difficult to quantify, a 
simple analysis of spending and space assets can give an estimate of the relative importance of 
each nation’s space program. Table 1 is a quick reference comparing U.S. and Chinese space 
assets. 157 
Table 1: Total number of U.S. and Chinese satellites by orbital régime and function (as of April 
2019). 
Total Number of U.S. Satellites: 858 
Civil: 20 Commercial: 494 Government: 178 Military 166 
GEO: 189 MEO: 31 LEO: 616 HEO: 22 
Total Number of Chinese Satellites: 250 
Civil: 25 Commercial: 46 Government: 113 Military: 100 
GEO: 56 MEO:24 LEO: 203 HEO: 1 
 
The current space regime and total absence of space weapons is highly advantageous to the 
United States.158 The relative magnitude of preference can be shown in Figure 3.  
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  China 
  C D 
U.S. 
C 6, 3 x,y 
D x,y x,y 
Figure 3: China and the U.S.’s utility given a cooperate/cooperate outcome. 
b. Defect/Defect 
The ubiquity of space technology has also yielded the negative externality of 
overcrowding the space domain. Despite its seemingly unlimited size, there are a limited number 
of useful earth-centric orbits to optimize terrestrial coverage. It is projected that there are over 
300,000 medium sized objects capable of causing catastrophic failure of a satellite upon collision 
currently in earth’s orbit.159 Of these objects, 20,000 are actively tracked by the comparatively 
robust space surveillance network (SSN) of the United States Air Force, only 1,000 are active 
payloads, and even fewer have maneuver capability.160 Recent trends indicate that the problem of 
orbital congestion will only worsen in the coming decades as the barriers to entry are reduced. 
Launch service cost is rapidly decreasing due to an increased number of service providers and 
technology revolutions such as reusable rockets. Also, the miniaturization and simplification of 
satellite payloads further reduces the cost and infrastructure needed to be a spacefairing 
nation.161 This is evidenced by the near doubling of state operated satellites from 27 in 2000 to 
over 50 in 2012, coupled with a near doubling in total space objects from 1997 to 2007.162 
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The accumulation of space debris is a vital concern to the sustainable development of the 
space environment due to the increased probability of conjunction between active payloads and 
all other objects that results from crowded orbits. This increase in collision probability occurs 
proportionally to the number of objects in a given orbital domain. The tripling of orbital debris 
projected to occur in the next century, due to routine use and accumulation alone, would cause a 
tenfold increase in the probability of collision. In the event of a catastrophic collision between 
two objects, the resulting debris cloud could cause a cascading effect. Each successive collision 
increases the probability of another occurrence in a given orbit until an instability threshold is 
reached. At this threshold, debris removal due to decay would be negligible compared to debris 
created by subsequent collisions. As the propagation of debris continues, the cost of launching a 
satellite would eventually outweigh the benefits received due to the probability of that asset 
being destroyed by errant debris, effectively rendering the given orbit unusable. This debris 
propagation model and the dangers associated with it are colloquially referred to as the Kessler 
Syndrome. Kessler asserts unstable regions of low earth orbit (LEO) currently exist and that, 
barring the addition of more debris, a major collision would occur once every 10-20 years. If 
debris doubles, as it has in the last decade, the collision rate would increase to 2.5 years. 
Although most models’ time scales are on the order of centuries, it is widely accepted that the 
current rate of debris accumulation will render critical orbits unusable unless immediate 
measures are taken to return stability.163 
There is near universal acceptance of the danger space debris presents, yet little 
substantive action has been taken to solve the problem. Current debris accumulation and 
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propagation models show that earth orbiting domains are finite resources. Continued 
unsustainable development moving forward may preclude future usage, making earth orbits 
rivalrous goods.164 Furthermore, orbital domains are made a non-excludable good by the OST 
which states, “Outer space… shall be free for exploration and use by all States without 
discrimination of any kind.”165 As a non-excludable public good, space succumbs to the tragedy 
of the commons where the privately beneficial strategy of space utilization differs significantly 
from the socially optimal strategy promoting orbital stability.166 Understandably, most analysis 
has focused on solving the problem of orbital instability by addressing the market failure 
responsible for debris creation. The current reasoning suggests that if actors creating space debris 
internalize the cost of their actions, a solution can arise. Proposed solutions run the gamut of 
ideologies from free market tax incentives, to command and control legislation, to restructuring 
orbital property rights. Scientific solutions have also been proposed, but technological feasibility 
and cost remain major problems. Furthermore, analogous environments susceptible to the 
tragedy of the commons have been examined in hopes that they may prove applicable to the 
problem of orbit instability.167 This analysis is ultimately useful if the problem is to be solved 
under nominal conditions, but there is an underlying problem that needs to be addressed before 
any of these proposed solutions can realistically be enacted.  
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On January 11, 2007 the Chinese government conducted a direct ascent anti-satellite 
(ASAT) test on the defunct Fengyun-1C weather satellite. This event is the single greatest source 
of orbital debris, as it created 3,000 objects greater than 10cm out of 20,000 total tracked by the 
U.S. SSN, and an estimated 150,000 smaller untracked objects.168 Due to the limitations of the 
SSN, the extent of the debris cloud has not been completely characterized, but NASA estimates 
Fengyun-1C debris comprises one third of LEO debris.169 Between the 2009 Iridium-Cosmos 
collision and the destruction of the Fengyun-1C, the number of cataloged fragmentation debris 
doubled after remaining stable during the 20 years prior. The Fengyun-1C debris cloud has been 
deemed dangerous to LEO, proving responsible for multiple near collisions or spacecraft 
damaging incidents. Within six months of the test, NASA’s Terra spacecraft and the 
International Space Station (ISS) both required orbit changes to reduce collision probability with 
Fengyun-1C debris. In 2013, a Russian cubesat was damaged by a small piece of debris.170 
Alarmingly, the severity of the ASAT test far exceeded NASAs standard break-up prediction 
model, making Kessler’s original predictions seem conservative.171 Intentional, avoidable debris 
creating incidents exacerbate an already dire problem, threatening to push affected orbital 
regimes into instability and eliminate their future usefulness. The Fengyun-1C debris cloud 
exists in the 750km-900km orbital regime that hosts critical scientific and application spacecraft. 
The underlying problem is that satellites with a given mission tend to group together in a 
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relatively narrow orbital regime because it is physically advantageous for accomplishing that 
task. ASATs seek to destroy an enemy’s capability, but in doing so have the externality of 
putting other satellites performing a similar mission at risk. Therefore, kinetic ASAT warfare is 
incompatible with the sustainable development of space.  
Despite global outrage over the 2007 test, China maintains a robust ASAT program. In 
2008 astronauts conducting the first Chinese spacewalk released a microsat that passed 
dangerously close to the ISS and was thought to be a demonstration of a co-orbital ASAT 
capability.172 Kinetic kill ASAT launches in 2013 and 2015 used the same booster as the 2007 
Fengyun-1C test but are thought to demonstrate the ability to hold orbits above LEO at risk.173 In 
2018, a new booster was tested, indicating intentional progression of the kinetic ASAT program 
through continued technology development.174 As China’s kinetic ASAT program reaches initial 
operational capability (estimated for 2020), the development of road-mobile assets serves the 
purpose of increasing the survivability of its ASAT capability.175 China’s official policy 
emphasizes the peaceful use of outer space and calls for a ban on space weapons. In 2008, China 
and Russia jointly submitted a draft treaty designed to curb the weaponization of space and 
prevent a space arms race at the UN Conference on Disarmament. The proposal called for a ban 
on orbiting weapons, but specifically excluded earth-based weapons, as well as direct ascent 
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ASATs.176 The clear desire to continue developing ASAT technology, despite significant soft 
power repercussions, is indicative that holding an opponent’s space capabilities at risk is a key 
part of China’s strategic development. It presents a seemingly usable sub-nuclear option for 
credible strategic deterrence and may also be used for conventional warfighting. 
Anti-satellite weapons existed during the Cold War, but a system of mutual restraint 
developed by the United States and Russia ensured that the probability of using them remained 
very low. A conflict in space between the two rivals was likely to expand into other domains, 
including nuclear warfare. Reciprocity and escalation was expected in the event of a kinetic 
ASAT attack, and a series of robust firebreaks arose to prevent experimental missteps by both 
nations. The use of ASATs represented the ultimate no-win situation for either side as there was 
no significant comparative advantage to be gained from their use.177 It was necessity and fear 
that drove the superpowers to establish international conventions, such as the OST and Liability 
Convention, to codify acceptable behavior in space. The significant consequences of nuclear war 
meant that the mechanisms of strategic restraint were well developed and well understood by 
both powers in order to lower the probability of a catastrophic breakdown occurring. However, 
these mechanisms do not exist in Sino-U.S. relations due to asymmetry in the strategic domains. 
China has adopted a no nuclear first strike policy and an examination of its current capabilities 
supports that rhetoric. Its second strike capability is, in its own estimation, only enough to deter a 
first strike by the United States and avoid escalation dominance in the nuclear domain. The 
                                                 
176 David Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of 
Vulnerability (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2011), 56-57. 
177 For a detailed discussion on ASAT systems and mutural restraint during the Cold War see: Steve Weber, 
“Antisatellite Weapons,” in Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1991) or Kurt Gottfried and Richard Lebow, “Anti-Satellite Weapons: Weighing the Risks,” Daedalus 114, 
no. 2 (1985). 
 53 
 
Chinese are unwilling to bear the cost of an expanded nuclear arsenal to counter U.S. capabilities 
and see little to be gained from a nuclear arms race with the United States.178 The lack of nuclear 
parity means that the consequences of space warfare between the two countries are lower 
because the conflict does not present a substantial risk of escalating to the nuclear domain. This 
strategic decoupling present in Sino-U.S. relations fundamentally increases the probability of an 
attack against satellite systems. 179 
Given the risk to the space environment presented by kinetic ASAT warfare and the robust 
capability of China and the United States to hold the entire domain at risk, it initially appears as 
if the cost of mutual defection is much greater than the benefit to be gained from mutual 
cooperation. The cost of mutual defection accounts for the loss of the space domain (for both 
current and future use) and is proportional to the gain from mutual cooperation. This is 
represented in Figure 4.  
  China 
  C D 
U.S. 
C 6,3 x,y 
D x,y -600,       -300 
Figure 4: China and the U.S.’s utility given a defect/defect outcome. 
 However, due to the advancement of non- and low-kinetic ASAT technology, holding an 
opponent’s space assets at risk while continuing to use the domain are not mutually exclusive 
strategies. Space systems are comprised of space, ground, and user segments integrated through 
data links. Any of these segments and links can be targeted by an attack to gain the desired 
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effect; the attacks can take place on a variable time scale, with or without creating debris, and 
causing permanent or reversible damage to a space system. The severity of these effects can be 
scaled for level of conflict.180 Electronic jamming of either uplink or downlink signals can 
impair satellite functionality and serve as a cost-effective soft-kill weapon. Laser weapons 
impact a satellite’s electro-optical detectors and can be used to temporarily blind a satellite or 
achieve a hard kill. Similarly, radio frequency (RF) weapons can be used to cause a variable 
amount of damage to satellites, depending on energy levels. Physical attacks on terrestrial 
ground segments can disrupt weak points in the system. Likewise, cyber-attacks can disrupt 
functionality without an attack on the space segment. Aside from the kinetic direct ascent ASAT 
and co-orbital ASAT threats already mentioned, co-orbital rendezvous and grappling can 
kinetically disable a satellite without creating excessive debris.181  
The DoD’s 2018 annual report to Congress about the Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China states, 
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is acquiring a range of technologies to improve 
China’s counterspace capabilities. In addition to the development of directed energy 
weapons and satellite jammers, China is also developing direct-ascent and co-orbital 
kinetic kill capabilities and has probably made progress on the anti-satellite missile 
system it tested in July 2014. China is employing more sophisticated satellite operations 
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and is probably testing dual-use technologies in space that could be applied to 
counterspace missions.182 
The report also lists the development of solid-state and chemical lasers to be used on ground-
based and airborne platforms as a focus of Chinese technological development.183 A report 
prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission noted extensive 
Chinese academic literature concerning the jamming of U.S. military satellite communications 
and the development of lasers for military purposes.184  
China has demonstrated its ability to carry out sub-lethal attacks on space systems. In 2006, 
the NRO confirmed that Chinese lasers had illuminated U.S. satellites.185 Although this test did 
no permanent damage, it is significant for two reasons: first, scaling up power to cause 
permanent damage is not prohibitively difficult, and second, satellite laser ranging (SLR) is 
essential to China’s counterspace kill chain for direct ascent or co-orbital ASATs.186 
Furthermore, China has demonstrated robust proximity operation and co-orbital rendezvous 
capability. The SJ-17, a GEO “technical demonstrator” satellite, has executed proximity 
operations with at least four Chinese satellites, some close approaches coming within 1 km.187 
The satellite has also shown significant maneuver capability, alternating between a 10-20 
degree/day drift rate and proximity operations with a relatively stationary object on multiple 
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occasions.188 Multiple other close proximity operations and co-orbital rendezvous missions have 
occurred in the past decade, indicating a technically robust Chinese capability.189 Most 
importantly, Chinese cyber warfare capabilities are essential to disabling U.S. space C4ISR 
capabilities during the initial stages of a conflict.190 Multiple cyber-attacks against U.S. satellite 
command and control systems are consistent with Chinese cyber warfare operations; however, 
cyber-attack attribution is difficult and China denies all involvement.191 
Although the development of these technologies is in the technical demonstration phase and 
may be far from initial operational capability, the option to fight a space war on a sub-
catastrophic level greatly impacts the game. Rather than a conflict in space inevitably resulting in 
widespread environmental contamination, China has options for proportionality and escalation. 
Although China’s most robust ASAT capability is direct ascent kinetic kill vehicles (KKV), it is 
quickly fielding other means of interdicting U.S. space abilities. Therefore, the cost of mutual 
defection in space is not automatically catastrophic, as it would be in a game of nuclear 
brinksmanship. It cannot be assumed that in the case of Sino-U.S. conflict that the cost of mutual 
defection is significantly greater than the benefit to be gained from mutual cooperation. In the 
case of an arms race, the cost of defection would be the opportunity cost examined earlier. As 
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more money is spent on defense, less is available to spend on beneficial commercial capabilities. 
In the case of low to medium-grade conflict the cost of defection relies on a combination of the 
value of one’s own space systems and the opponent’s capability to hold those systems at risk. 
Due to a robust Chinese ASAT program and high value of U.S. space systems, there is a strong 
U.S. aversion to this outcome. Similarly, U.S. ASAT programs can hold Chinese assets at risk 
with a variety of means. However, the value of Chinese systems is considerably less than that of 
the U.S.’s, therefore the Chinese aversion to mutual defection is less than that of the U.S. A 
conflict where the KKV threshold has not been crossed is shown in Figure 5. 
  China 
  C D 
U.S. 
C 6, 3 x,y 
D x,y -3, -1 
Figure 5: China and the U.S.’s utility given a defect/defect outcome where no KKV threshold has 
been crossed. 
c. Defect/Cooperate 
The magnitude of each player’s preference for Defect/Cooperate (D/C) is dependent on 
its benefit from establishing space control (maintaining one’s own use of space or excluding an 
opponent from doing so), while the magnitude of its aversion to Cooperate/Defect (C/D) is 
dependent on the detriment of allowing the other player to do the same. In short, what is to be 
gained or lost by one player establishing space control? If the players view each other as benign, 
reasonably expecting that the other player gaining space control will not exclude their own use of 
the domain, the magnitude of the C/D or D/C choice is negligible. The magnitude becomes 
substantial when the ability of one player to deny use of the space domain to the other has 
significant impact on the geostrategic balance of power. The economic benefit gained by being 
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able to deny a competitor access to the marketplace is a clear advantage. However, the effect of 
space control extends far beyond economics. Space effects play a critical role in the ability of the 
U.S. and China to project both soft and hard power influence in East Asia.  
Generally, space force enhancement functions include intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR), launch detection, missile tracking, environmental monitoring, satellite 
communication, positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) and navigation warfare 
(NAVWAR).192 China and the United States possess operationally mature capabilities that 
enable them to perform all these functions, and are both actively improving their force 
enhancement capabilities: communications satellites enable command and control (C2) 
infrastructure to direct warfighting effort; launch detection and missile tracking allows for force 
protection through early warning and ballistic missile defense (BMD) enhancement; space-based 
ISR aids in forming a comprehensive picture of an adversary’s infrastructure and capabilities, 
allows for robust targeting, and contributes to general situational awareness (SA); and PNT 
increases the effectiveness of precision strike. 193 Therefore, space-based operations remain a 
vital part of the overall information architecture used to enable joint operations at all stages of a 
conflict.194 During a conflict in East Asia, space-based assets will be essential for the U.S. to be 
able to conduct surveillance of Chinese warfighting capabilities, readiness, and military 
movements for the purposes of knowing how to concentrate its own forces. Space-based assets 
would be used to locate and track naval, air, and rocket forces, C2 nodes, ISR sensors, and troop 
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staging areas, and would be used to direct, coordinate, and manage U.S. forces. This 
functionality makes space a critical component of weapons performance and C2.195 Both U.S. 
and Chinese strategists have developed doctrine to account for the importance of integrated 
information systems in military operations. China has formalized its concept of local wars under 
informationized conditions in a 2004 defense white paper.196 The U.S. concept of command, 
control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) is 
similar. 
Although the use of C4ISR systems is essential to all modern battlefields, they have 
greater utility when campaigns occur over long distances, large areas, and involve multi-domain 
forces. Space-based C4ISR becomes particularly important when land, maritime, and air-based 
systems are forced to operate at a high cost and can no longer provide broad area continuous 
coverage.197 Both of these conditions will likely be met during an anti-access, area denial 
(A2/AD) campaign between the U.S. and China in East Asia. China intends to leverage its 
continental position to employ weapon systems with longer range and heavier payloads than are 
available to the U.S., who tends to act in an expeditionary capacity from maritime bases of 
operation. This offensive capability will be combined with anti-satellite and cyber warfare 
capabilities to overcome U.S. C4ISR advantage and mitigate its conventional deterrent threat 
against mainland China.198  
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A2/AD campaigns have precedence in military history, from Salamis in 480 BCE, to the 
Battle of Britain in 1940.199 Most recently and relevantly, the Soviet Union fielded A2/AD 
capabilities against the United States during the Cold War. Beginning in the 1970s, the Soviets 
fielded capabilities to locate and target U.S. naval assets, including surveillance satellites, 
submarines, and long-range, land-based reconnaissance aircraft. This was combined with anti-
ship cruise missiles and long-range strike aircraft to create significant standoff distance between 
U.S. carrier groups and the Russian mainland. Although the U.S. responded by fielding long-
range, carrier-based strike aircraft, long-range air-to-air missiles, and anti-satellite capabilities to 
counter the Soviet “reconnaissance-strike complex,” there was little continued emphasis on these 
capabilities after the 1980s, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union.200 The Chinese are rapidly 
developing their version of the reconnaissance-strike complex with the benefit of 30 additional 
years of technological advances.201 
China possesses a more than adequate supply of SRBMs, Land Attack Missiles, and 
Anti-ship missiles that are survivable and mobile.  
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Figure 6: Map of China’s offensive IRBM capabilities202 
It should be noted that the delivery of H-6 with LACM options is dependent on the ability of the 
H-6 bomber to range into the western Pacific; additionally, the DF-26 is a nascent capability, 
being revealed publicly for the first time in 2015.203 This is a distinct advantage over the United 
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States, who signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, which 
prohibited it from maintaining ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 
500 and 5,500km.204 The U.S. withdrew from the INF Treaty on February 01, 2019 ostensibly 
citing Russia’s noncompliance with the treaty.205 It is likely that the U.S. and its allies will begin 
to develop their own IRBM centric reconnaissance-strike complex to counter that of China and 
“level the playing field”.206  However, it may take years for the U.S. and its allies to establish 
parity with China in IRBM technology, tactics, and deployment.207 Furthermore, IADS 
infrastructure and air capabilities within mainland China, and on islands close to China’s coast, 
are designed to prevent the U.S. from utilizing its global strike capability to interdict strategic 
targets within China.208 If they are able to do so, China can create a coastal defense zone that 
U.S. forces cannot penetrate without accepting disproportionate risk.209 However, offensive 
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systems need to be integrated with an over-the-horizon C4ISR targeting network to operate 
effectively. Satellite systems are an essential part of this network.210 
Currently, Chinese space-based ISR coverage lacks both persistence and integrated C2 
infrastructure adequate for targeting highly mobile U.S. Navy assets, and remains the weakest 
link in China’s targeting capabilities.211 In the event of a conflict, these gaps may be temporarily 
filled with launch-on-demand microsat constellations or repositioning existing capabilities.212 
Airborne ISR assets also have limited capabilities against naval assets, and will be operating in 
contested airspace.213 For a more long-term solution, new electro-optical, multi-spectral, and 
synthetic aperture radar capabilities are top development priorities and are projected to give 
China the ability to maintain a 30 minute revisit rate on U.S. naval forces by the early 2020s.214 
Additionally, the development of the Chinese Beidou PNT system, slated to be completed in 
2020, will drastically improve the accuracy of Chinese munitions.215 These two developments 
will allow China to conduct Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage, and Assess (F2T2EA) operations 
against both land and maritime assets within range of its land-based missiles.  
Within the physically large and geographically complex East Asian theater of operations, 
the success of conducting or countering A2/AD operations is largely reliant on the ability to 
maintain C4ISR operations, while denying the opponent the same capabilities. Consequently, 
both China and the United States are highly incentivized to acquire robust space force 
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enhancement capabilities, as well as offensive and defensive space control capabilities, in order 
to maintain the C4ISR edge. Space becomes increasingly important to A2/AD campaigns as both 
nations move further from their established bases (for example, if Sino-U.S. military interactions 
were to expand into the Indian Ocean).216  
Despite rapidly growing capabilities, there is evidence to suggest that Chinese strategists 
view themselves as possessing a relatively disadvantageous position in space operations 
compared to the United States. The strength of the U.S. position and vulnerability of Chinese 
capabilities is accentuated in PLA literature.217 They have observed three decades of space 
support in U.S. military operations and have assessed that the United States has a high reliance 
on military space effects to support a terrestrial campaign.218 Observing American operations in 
the Persian Gulf Wars, Kosovo, and Afghanistan has resulted in the belief that space systems 
cannot be divorced from their ability to help achieve the goals of terrestrial operations, and that 
space warfare will be decisive in gaining informational superiority during a regional conflict.219 
Chinese military literature estimates that the U.S. relied on space support for over 90% of all 
military communications, PNT, and reconnaissance and surveillance information during the 
Second Gulf War. It is estimated that this reliance has nearly doubled between the First and 
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Second Gulf Wars.220 These campaigns served as a wake-up call within the PLA due to the 
effective execution of a war under informationalized conditions against a mechanized 
opponent.221 Early American “informationalized” campaigns serve as a good analogy to a 
potential American campaign in the Pacific due to the mechanization of the Chinese military and 
the expeditionary requirements on the U.S. military.  
Given the vast technological advantage that the U.S. holds over China in such a critical 
warfighting domain, Chinese tacticians will not be able to wage a symmetric war. Rather, their 
concept of operations (CONOPS) employs asymmetric means in order to wage a limited conflict, 
with a focus on information warfare to create a temporary, localized advantage. This advantage 
is intended to deter U.S. intervention by eliminating their ability to hold Chinese assets at risk 
(denial of gains) while making action against China prohibitive in terms of both monetary and 
human cost (cost imposition).222 At the outset of the conflict, China may attack key U.S. 
capabilities for the purpose of crippling their ability to fight a war including C4ISR systems; 
logistics, transportation, and support facilities; air bases; sea lines of communication; and the 
American Pacific fleet.223 Chinese military literature has emphasized anti-satellite weapons as 
key capabilities to interdict American C4ISR capabilities and offset American advantage.224 This 
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idea has taken hold in the Chinese military to the point that space is often identified as America’s 
Achilles heel.225 
The Chinese strategy of using counterspace weapons to gain localized, temporary military 
advantage in order to achieve limited political aims makes two assumptions. First, the effects of 
Chinese counterspace capabilities must sufficiently disrupt the American F2T2EA process to 
deny U.S. gains from striking Chinese high value targets. As discussed above, the PLA is 
acquiring a range of technologies to improve its counterspace capabilities, including directed 
energy weapons, electronic warfare systems, and kinetic ASAT capabilities.226 However, it is 
important to differentiate between aspirational and operationally mature systems.227 The 
development of chemical and solid state laser technologies for employment in ground based 
and/or airborne weapon-grade systems is a top technology development priority for the PLA.228 
Despite a major research effort to this effect, the most tangible demonstration of the Chinese 
laser program has been a network of seven satellite laser ranging (SLR) stations that are capable 
of providing high-fidelity observation of space objects. These ranging stations operate at too low 
of power to damage optical sensors, but could be used as a critical piece of a counterspace kill 
chain for other anti-satellite systems (for example, a direct ascent kinetic ASAT). 229 Although 
scaling up the technology does not present a difficult technical problem, fielding a mobile, 
forward deployable capability may present difficulties.230 Likewise, co-orbital systems are in the 
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tech-demonstration phase and do not pose an operationally mature threat to U.S. capabilities. 
Forward deployed electromagnetic counterspace assets have the disadvantage of revealing the 
very capabilities they are attempting to conceal. Additionally, the U.S. has the advantage of 
defense in depth due to the sheer number of military space assets that it possesses. There is no 
guarantee that reversible effects employed against low-density, high demand assets will have the 
desired effects against American forces.231 Therefore, creating a C4ISR advantage may be reliant 
on employing a direct ascent ASAT capability. China has rapidly improved its ASAT capability 
since the initial 2007 debris causing event, conducting numerous tests and demonstrating its 
capability to hold objects at geosynchronous orbit at risk.232 Chinese military units have 
conducted operational training with ground-based ASAT missiles, which are expected to reach 
operational maturity within the next few years.233 
Second, Chinese strikes on U.S. space assets must not result in uncontrolled escalation. 
The advantage of possessing soft-kill technology is the suitability for low-intensity conflicts, 
while the use of destructive/non-reversible attacks will not be constrained during high-intensity 
conflicts.234 The use of exclusively non-lethal versus a combination of lethal and non-lethal 
capabilities can serve as strategic signaling about the phase of combat. However, due to a 
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capability and vulnerability gap, combined with a lack of credible retaliatory threat, a tit-for-tat 
strategy along a clearly defined escalation ladder may not be a legitimate strategy for the Sino-
U.S. relationship. 235 Counterspace action intended to have a tactical/operational effect may cross 
American strategic red lines, resulting in unintended escalation. For example, an attack on 
American overhead persistent infrared (OPIR) sensors would degrade their capability to detect 
conventional medium range ballistic missiles, with targets in the first island chain also interfering 
with the early detection of nuclear capable ICBMs launched against the U.S.236 Concerningly 
enough, there is evidence that the implication of interfering with or destroying strategically 
important U.S. capabilities has only been appreciated on the tactical and operational levels 
within the Chinese military.237 Similarly, a Chinese attack on U.S. space systems at the outset of 
a low-grade conflict could raise the likelihood of a “space Pearl Harbor,” which could, in turn, 
provoke the United States to contemplate pre-emptive attacks or horizontal escalation on the 
Chinese mainland.238 In addition, commercial-military integration and combined efforts may 
result in escalation with third parties. A significant portion of U.S. military communication and 
imaging capabilities are purchased from commercial companies or provided by allied nations, 
meaning that to adequately degrade U.S. military capabilities, an attack on non-military and/or 
non-U.S. assets is required.239 
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Chinese strategists cannot sufficiently disrupt U.S. capabilities without the use of kinetic 
capabilities, yet the use of kinetic capabilities will likely result in unacceptable escalation and 
threaten their own access to space.240 Considering this obstacle, China is incentivized to continue 
developing more robust soft-kill counterspace capabilities to make its deterrent capabilities both 
credible and usable. However, given the relationship asymmetry, no firmly established red lines, 
and lack of an articulated escalation ladder, there is no guarantee that a soft-kill strategy will 
contain escalation either. China may be forced to adopt a strategy of preemption and automatic 
escalation due to the fear that any attack on space assets will result in American escalation. 
Nevertheless, this strategy cedes China’s ability to conduct strategic signaling during a low-level 
conflict. For these reasons, a system of mutual restraint has not been established under the 
current status quo.  
Moving forward, the asymmetry between Chinese and American forces in East Asia will 
become less acceptable to China as its subjective security demands increase. In order to 
strengthen its deterrent threat in East Asia (through robust A2/AD capabilities), China must 
continue to develop its space based C4ISR systems. Consequently, the continued development of 
C4ISR and space control systems risks instigating an arms race with the United States and 
regional competitors, such as Japan and India. To avoid the potential conflict, China must 
accomplish this development with the utmost sensitivity and secrecy in order to prevent a 
counterbalancing reaction. In the context of the game theoretical framework, China is highly 
incentivized to upset the status quo and has much to gain from a Defect/Cooperate scenario. 
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Given the asymmetry in Chinese and American capabilities, China has more to gain from a 
Defect/Cooperate outcome than they do from mutual cooperation.  
If the United States permits Chinese military space capabilities to develop unopposed, two 
possible dynamics may result. First, as China’s reliance on space increases, so will its 
vulnerability to counterspace threats. This may allow for a system of mutual restraint to be 
established between the U.S. and China in the space domain.241 Second, as China’s conventional 
space capabilities achieve parity with U.S. capabilities, the U.S.’s conventional deterrent threat 
in the region could be weakened, consequently shifting the balance of power in East Asia 
towards China. Due to the importance of trans-pacific trade in the U.S. economy, it is unlikely 
that they will accept weakened extended deterrence in Asia. 242 Therefore, the United States 
shows preference towards the risk of mutual defection to the risk of being taken advantage of in 
a scenario where it cooperates in the face of Chinese defection. These preferences are shown in 
Figure 7. 
  China 
  C D 
U.S. 
C 6, 3 -5, 8 
D x,y -3, -1 
Figure 7: China and the U.S.’s utility given a U.S. cooperate/China defect outcome. 
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d. Cooperate/Defect 
The benefit of defecting while an opponent cooperates (i.e. pursuing space dominance) is 
an attractive option for states seeking to expand their sphere of influence or those that have 
judged that their security demands outweigh current capability. Although there is evidence that 
China fits these criteria and that they are motivated by potential gains of Defect/Cooperate, it is 
the fear of being exploited that makes Cooperate/Defect its most powerful preference. Extremely 
stable states with low subjective security demands and a favorable strategic position (such as the 
United States) have the luxury of being able to cooperate while their opponents defect. They can 
take a relatively relaxed posture in security affairs and wait for others to make their intentions 
clear before acting.243 Alternatively, nascent countries in a weak geostrategic position could 
ultimately face a loss of sovereignty if they chose to cooperate while an opponent defects. If 
China allows the U.S. to develop its space control capabilities uninhibited and itself remains 
unable to fight a space war, a loss of sovereignty could result for two possible reasons.244 First, 
as covered in earlier chapters, space support enables the United States to project military power 
into East Asia. If the U.S. can maintain use of its space support capabilities while denying China 
a vital link in the A2/AD chain, the U.S. is much more likely to have freedom of action close to 
the Chinese coast. This interferes with China’s expanded sovereignty claims in the East China 
Sea, South China Sea, Taiwan, and even outlying regions of continental China. It also gives U.S. 
forces strong coercive power by way of their ability to strike at key ground targets within China 
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and establish a blockade, grinding China’s largely sea-based economy to a halt.245 Likewise, a 
space blockade could deny China substantial economic benefits.  
Second, space control, space weaponization, and space force application are interrelated 
and legally contentious topics that have national sovereignty implications. The principal of 
overflight is strongly rooted in customary international law, beginning with the flight of Sputnik 
I during the Cold War. The ability of any nation to fly a satellite over any other nation on earth 
without violating its universally recognized national boundaries, combined with the lack of a 
prohibition of space weapons in the OST, theoretically allows for the delivery of kinetic effects 
to any nation on earth with only minutes of warning.246 The major proposed roles of space 
weapons are: defensive space control, offensive space control, space-to-ground force projection, 
and BMD.247 Generally, space based defensive and offensive space control options are limited 
by exorbitantly high cost, considerable susceptibility to countermeasures, and the availability of 
cheaper, more effective ground-based alternatives.248 Space-to-ground force projection options 
are prohibitively expensive ($66 million/strike) and logistically difficult (40-150 satellites for 
global coverage).249 Additionally, due to the offensive nature of space-to-ground weapons, soft 
power and legal consequences could raise the barriers to entry in developing and deploying such 
systems.250 Despite the cost, space-to-ground weapons are appealing due to their ability to 
impact targets where terrestrial assets are denied access, as well as their importance in shortening 
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the F2T2EA cycle.251 Space weapons could allow for the U.S. to maintain its global strike 
capability, even if China successfully employs its A2/AD strategy. This latent capacity would 
give the U.S. substantial deterrent capabilities if they retain the ability to target high-value assets, 
as well as considerable coercive propensity during a low-grade conflict.  
BMD is the final proposed role of space weaponization. Space systems can bolster a 
missile defense architecture by producing space-to-atmosphere effects on ballistic missiles, and 
by using space-based sensing capabilities to conduct tracking and targeting for ground-based 
BMD interceptors. Many Chinese feel that the development of U.S. BMD capabilities is an 
intentional first step towards space control.252 BMD systems can serve the role of ASAT 
weapon, interdict an opponent’s direct ascent ASAT weapon, or even intercept an opponent’s 
space launch. When a state possesses robust BMD capabilities, they have the potential to destroy 
an opponent’s space assets, destroy the ability to counter one’s own space assets, and restrict an 
opponent’s access to space, creating an in-atmosphere chokepoint. BMD capabilities are 
inherently space control weapons. Therefore, progress by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to 
field BMD capabilities, an abundance of American literature on space control via weaponization, 
and a renewed emphasis on space warfighting within the U.S. military will result in a strong 
counterbalance from China in an attempt to circumvent U.S. space hegemony.253 China has 
repeatedly defended the legal right to conduct warfare in space in response to a threat against its 
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sovereignty.254 The country’s expanding ASAT capabilities (covered in previous sections) will 
give teeth to this warning.  
Setting aside potential secondary functions, BMD’s primary capability remains ballistic 
missile defense. In 2001, the Bush administration withdrew from the 1972 ABM treaty, signed 
by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Although China was not party to the treaty and the U.S. was 
transparent that its proposed missile defense systems were not aimed at China, the Chinese 
staunchly opposed the pullout and suggested that an increase in nuclear arsenal may be 
warranted.255 China viewed the ABM treaty as a cornerstone of its strategic stability.256 Unlike 
the U.S. and Russian principle of mutually assured destruction and concerns of a missile gap 
during the Cold War, China believes that a small nuclear arsenal is adequate to field a minimum 
deterrent threat.257 China continues to tout a no first-use commitment, does not have nuclear 
weapons on alert, and possesses comparatively few nuclear weapons. It believes that if a small 
retaliatory force survives a U.S. or Russian first strike and is able to create only tens of thousands 
of casualties for an opponent, enemy loss aversion will create deterrence.258 Therefore, even a 
seemingly small, defensive BMD deployment aimed at “rogue states” could be capable of 
destroying China’s small retaliatory force, upsetting Sino-U.S. nuclear deterrence, and leaving 
China susceptible to nuclear blackmail.259 Increasing the capability and scope of the BMD 
program could promote a dangerous escalatory dynamic, which may include pressuring China to 
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reduce the vulnerability of its arsenal by delegating launch authority, increasing mobility, 
increasing the total number of available ICBMs, pursuing advanced reentry vehicle technology, 
putting ICBMs on alert, and adopting a limited deterrence posture.260 There is evidence that 
some of these efforts are already underway.261 Any of these possibilities would have a 
counterproductive effect of decreasing nuclear stability. Most dangerously, growing U.S. missile 
defense capabilities have forced space war and nuclear deterrence to become increasingly 
intertwined in the minds of Chinese strategists.262  
U.S. domination of space is dangerous to China for three reasons. First, it would give the 
U.S. military a conventional military advantage in East Asia. This degrades the Chinese deterrent 
within the first island chain, strengthening the resolve of a pro-U.S. alliance in the region. 
Second, a U.S. space blockade of Chinese space capabilities could be a complimentary step to a 
sea-based blockade, disrupting the Chinese economy and giving the U.S. strong coercive power. 
Third, a robust BMD program, protected and enhanced by space domination, disrupts the Sino-
U.S. strategic balance and leaves China susceptible to nuclear blackmail. China may not be able 
to dominate space globally, limiting the positive utility of a potential DC outcome. However, a 
CD outcome where the United States is able to achieve space domination, rather than space 
superiority, would be catastrophic for Chinese sovereignty. China must remain capable of 
denying the U.S. space domination, resulting in a strong preference against CD. Alternatively, 
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the U.S. has a slightly weaker preference for this outcome. It already enjoys space superiority, 
and the marginal benefit between space superiority and space domination is minimal. These 
preferences are represented in Figure 8.  
  China 
  C D 
U.S. 
C 6, 3 -5, 8 
D 8, -10 -3, -1 
Figure 8: China and the U.S.’s utility given a Cooperate/Cooperate outcome. 
e. Analysis 
Generally, nuclear weapons do not vary by kind, but by scale. In reality, the menu options 
range from large explosion to slightly larger explosion delivered in different ways; any 
combination of size and delivery method causes mass casualties. There is a strong moral 
compunction against using nuclear weapons, which has resulted in two major thresholds being 
formed during the Cold War. The first threshold was the use of nuclear weapons themselves. The 
second was their implementation as strategic, rather than tactical, weapons.263 On the other hand, 
ASAT weapons are vastly varied by kind and effect. They range from a possible nuclear 
detonation, causing wide scale environmental degradation, to a low-power laser resulting in 
temporary effects. Consequently, the ASAT weapon threshold does not hold the same weight as 
the nuclear threshold. This threshold was crossed when Chinese and Russian lasers targeted U.S. 
satellites and no symmetrical escalation resulted. A threshold for the use of non-reversible effects 
could emerge, but this is more likely to be seen as an extension of conventional warfare.264 
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Similar to nuclear weapons, debris causing ASAT events (explored in prior sections) have the 
potential to preclude the future use of space and cause strategic damage to all states. As a result, 
the most likely firebreak on which a system of mutual restraint could be based on is the debris 
causing threshold. Therefore, ASAT weapons can be implemented on both 
conventional/operational and strategic levels, depending on their capability to generate debris. 
Understanding this dichotomy is essential to analyzing space strategy within a game theoretical 
framework. It is represented by two 2x2 matrices in Figure 9. The left matrix represents a 
scenario where the threshold of debris causing ASAT events has been crossed, and the right 
represents a scenario where non-debris causing ASATs are in play. 
 
  
With Debris 
 
China 
  C D 
U.S. 
C 6,3 -5,8 
D 8,10 -600,       -300 
   
Without Debris 
 
China 
  C D 
U.S. 
C 6,3 -5,8 
D 8,-10 -3, -1 
Figure 9: Comparing utility in two scenarios. The 2x2 matrix on the left shows utility when the 
debris causing threshold has been crossed. The 2x2 matrix shows utility in a sub-threshold 
conflict. 
Due to asymmetry in the magnitude of utility, preferences can be represented as ordinal for the 
purpose of simplification.  A scale of 1-4 shows actor preferences from least strong to most 
strong. 
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With Debris 
(Chicken) 
 
China 
  C D 
U.S. 
C 3,3 2,4 
D 4,2 1, 1 
   
Without Debris 
(Security 
Dilemma) 
 
China 
  C D 
U.S. 
C 3,3 1,4 
D 4,1 2,2 
Figure 10: Shows ordinal preferences for both scenarios. Ordinal preference does not represent 
the magnitude of actor preferences, but is a better visual representation of the game. 
If debris causing ASATs are introduced into the game, the resulting dynamic is one in 
which crossing the debris threshold would cause both China and the U.S. to end up with their 
worst possible outcome. The space environment faces long-term damage, both countries lose out 
on future gains from utilizing space, and their ability to use space support to wage a conventional 
war is reduced. However, each side has more to gain by defecting than moving to the globally 
optimal solution of mutual cooperation. The choice to develop space control capabilities can give 
either player strategic and operational advantages, a benefit neither player is willing to sacrifice. 
The first to change its strategy to cooperate, rather than risk the consequences of the annihilation 
of space, cedes this advantage to its opponent, essentially losing the game. Each player weighs 
the probability and consequences of the catastrophic outcome occurring against the probability of 
the other player backing down and gaining advantage. This results in brinksmanship, a race to 
establish commitment and credibility in an effort to cause the other to back down.265 A game 
with these characteristics is commonly known as chicken.  
                                                 
265 Peter Bennett, “Modeling Decisions in International Relations,” 23-24; The game of Chicken refers to a 
scenario where Nash Equilibria are Cooperate/Defect and Defect/Cooperate AND the risk of Defect/Defect 
outweighs the risk of Cooperate/Defect.  
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In a struggle for space control without the introduction of debris-causing ASATs, the 
worst possible outcome for either side would be getting taken advantage of when choosing to 
cooperate, while the other side defects. Mutual cooperation remains the globally optimal solution 
and mutual defection remains the global minimum. Similar to a game of chicken, both players 
can gain from exploiting the other, more than they can in a cooperative scenario. However, the 
dynamic that prevents players from moving to the globally optimal solution is the fear of being 
exploited in a Cooperate/Defect scenario, rather than the fear of Defect/Defect resulting in an 
environmental catastrophe. Therefore, increasing the value of mutual cooperation and decreasing 
the probability of the other side defecting becomes important in order to decrease fear of a 
Cooperate/Defect scenario. The game is about establishing trust in order to engender 
cooperation, rather than establishing credibility to cause the other side to back down. This is 
known as a security dilemma.266 In a security dilemma, modeled in figure 9, the choice of both 
players can be predicted. If China believes that the United States will defect, it must also defect, 
lest it be taken advantage of. If China believes that the United States will cooperate, it will also 
defect to take advantage of U.S. cooperation. Since this is a symmetric game, the United States’ 
choices will be the same. Therefore, according to the game theoretical model presented, Sino-
U.S. space relations are engaged in a downward spiral of arms racing and competition. 
C. Testing the zero-sum assumption:  
When defining the game in previous chapters, it was assumed that global utility was constant, 
resulting in a zero-sum game. In the practical application of game theory, a zero-sum relationship 
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is essential to the security dilemma operating as modeled. When one state seeks security, it does 
so at the expense of another, driving fear of Cooperate/Defect. However, if a state will not 
decrease the security of another by increasing its own, there is no reason to fear 
Cooperate/Defect and the security dilemma fails to operate. There are two crucial variables in 
determining how strong the zero-sum assumption is (and how strongly the security dilemma 
operates): whether defensive weapons and policies can be distinguished from offensive ones, and 
whether the offense has the advantage.267 A combination of these variables creates four worlds in 
which the security dilemma operates at different magnitudes.  
  Offense-Defense 
  Offense 
Advantage 
Defense 
Advantage 
Distinguishability 
Distinguishable  Doubly dangerous security dilemma  
Security dilemma, 
requirements may 
be compatible 
Not-
Distinguishable  
No security 
dilemma, but 
aggression 
possible 
Doubly Stable 
Figure 11: Four worlds created by offense-defense balance and distinguishability, in which the 
security dilemma operates at different strengths. 268 
f. Offense/Defense Balance:  
In order to determine an offense-defense balance, two questions must be asked. The first is 
an economic one: is it more cost effective to build offensive or defensive weapons? 269 In this 
case, the question can be modified to: is it more cost effective to provide space effects or disrupt 
them? Currently, it is much more economically efficient to disrupt space effects for two reasons. 
                                                 
267 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 186-187. 
268 Jervis, 211 
269 Jervis, 188-194. 
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First, the geography of the space domain makes it favorable to the offense. The high fuel cost 
required to significantly alter satellites’ orbits keeps them in relatively stable, predictable orbits 
that make tracking and targeting straightforward.270 China already employs seven ground-based 
satellite SLR stations on the Chinese mainland to detect, track, and characterize space objects 
with sub centimeter level accuracy.271 However, they are expanding their space surveillance 
efforts with an SLR station in Argentina, the deployment of space surveillance and tracking 
ships, and multiple international data sharing agreements.272 Due to recent, rapid improvements 
in SSA capabilities, passive means of defense, such as cover and concealment, have become lost 
despite the vastness of space. Furthermore, efficient travel in space requires adherence to 
economically favorable lanes of travel, creating strategic chokepoints through which satellites in 
any regime must pass. Likewise, there are a limited number of economically advantageous 
orbits, allowing space control efforts to be focused at a few central nodes.273 Defensive 
principles, such as defense in depth and extended lines of communication, have weak analogies 
in the space environment. Sheer numbers of satellite systems can create defense in depth, but 
space is largely absent of the geographic features that would normally be used. These combined 
factors make passive defense in the space environment problematic, therefore favoring offensive 
tactics. 
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Second, the current state of technology favors the offense. Active means of defense add cost 
by adding complexity and weight to already expensive satellite systems. Adding fuel in order to 
make satellites more maneuverable adds extraneous weight to a system and proportionally 
increases launch costs at $20k/kg into LEO.274 Due to the exponential nature of the rocket 
equation, the mass penalty increases rapidly as total ΔV (maneuverability) increases.  
 
Figure 12: The ratio of propellant mass to satellite mass required to produce a given ΔV using 
conventional propulsion. 275 
Look, shoot, look procedures commonly in practice for DAASAT weapons and the high 
maneuverability of co-orbital ASAT systems mean that preparing a satellite to avoid either of 
these threats would require it to perform a series of costly maneuvers. This increases on-board 
fuel requirements, mass, and ultimately, cost. Additionally, added maneuverability is not an 
effective countermeasure against ground-based threats, such as jammers and lasers. Employing 
bodyguard satellites may be a solution to protect key systems, but their effectiveness against a 
                                                 
274 Joan Johnson-Freese, Heavenly Ambitions, 71. 
275 David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security (Cambridge: American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2005), 70. 
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determined opponent is dubious and adds cost to the system.276 The same principles hold true for 
physical shielding. On the other hand, ASAT systems are smaller, less massive, more 
maneuverable, and less complex than the space systems they are designed to defeat.277 Due to 
the fragility of space systems and the massive kinetic energy of a small object traveling at 7,600 
m/s, space is a scenario in which a well-aimed brick beats a multimillion-dollar engineering 
marvel. Lifting a satellite into orbit is much more demanding than simply lifting an ASAT to 
high altitude in order to conduct an attack.278 Further, the relatively complex, fragile, and 
physically long lines of communication on which space systems rely are susceptible to attack via 
a multitude of means.279 When taken together, these factors mean that space disruption is much 
more cost effective than constructive use.280 Therefore, as is true in the current state of 
technology, when each dollar spent on offense can overcome each dollar spent on defense, the 
players are incentivized to build offensive forces.281 
The second question necessary to determine offense-defense balance is one of military 
utility: has first-strike stability been established? When a successful attack will weaken the other 
side to the point where victory becomes quick, bloodless, and decisive, this increases the 
incentives to strike first and makes establishing first-strike stability difficult.282 The Chinese 
desire to use counterspace assets for the purpose of creating a temporary, localized advantage 
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within the East Asian theater (which has already been covered at length) suggests that they are 
highly incentivized by the prospect of a first-strike that disrupts U.S. expeditionary capability.283 
In a simple denial of gains versus cost imposition equation, the high value of U.S. space systems, 
and the distinct lack of defensive measures to protect them with, means that creating deterrence 
through denial of gains is unlikely. Cost imposition strategy has its own set of concerns. First, a 
symmetric U.S. deterrent threat has little credibility. Engaging in a tit-for-tat exchange with 
ASAT systems is not a credible deterrent because China has more to gain from this strategy.284 
Whereas, an asymmetric attack using conventional forces (for example, an attack on terrestrial 
segments of space systems within China) or other domains (nuclear, cyber, terrestrial) risks 
horizontal escalation, broadens the scope of conflict, and could allow China to seize the 
narrative.285 Second, remaining U.S. deterrent options lack proportionality. If China applies sub-
lethal counterspace options against the high value of space systems, the gains China reaps from 
ASAT attacks will outweigh perceived cost (unless the U.S. threatens a seemingly 
disproportionate response).286 This has created a gap between credible threat and proportionality, 
where any U.S. response has either a credibility or proportionality problem, limiting options for 
establishing first-strike stability.  
g. Dual-Use Problem 
The second crucial variable in testing the zero-sum nature of the game is whether defensive 
weapons can be distinguished from offensive ones. Offense-defense differentiation alleviates the 
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security dilemma by allowing states to act in ways that are clearly defined as offensive or 
defensive, bolstering the efficacy of strategic signaling. This is due to three underlying 
mechanisms. First, each player can clearly signal that its military capabilities are in line with its 
subjective security demands, curtailing the belief that it is expansionist and threatening another 
state’s security. Second, when the buildup of offensive forces is obvious, it allows other players 
to obtain advance warning of aggression. This advance warning lowers the gains from a surprise 
attack and alleviates the fear of being taken advantage of in a Cooperate/Defect scenario. Third, 
clear differentiation between offensive and defensive weapons, as well as military and civilian 
technologies, allows for clear arms control agreements to be put in place.287 This dynamic 
operates in the traditional sense, where offensive weapons are those used to attack or interdict an 
opponent’s military and expand one’s own territory. Therefore, if space systems are used 
specifically to disable an opponent’s space systems, prevent it from using the medium, or disrupt 
its use of space effect, it can be labeled as offensive. However, some space technologies may be 
used for either offensive or defensive purposes. The ubiquity of space effects in military 
operations mean that some space systems are inherently neutral but can be treated as offensive or 
defensive depending on the terrestrial operations they support. Furthermore, military and civilian 
uses of space systems are difficult to differentiate, confounding all three underlying mechanisms. 
These factors make offense-defense differentiation extremely difficult, further confounding the 
Sino-U.S. security dilemma. 
The current state of technology in space is resoundingly unfavorable to offense-defense 
differentiation. Many closely related technologies may either serve as ASAT weapons, as 
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defensive weapons, or completely benign tools to further the peaceful uses of space. For 
example, a satellite with the ability to conduct rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) can 
be used as an offensive counterspace weapon to disable an opponent’s satellite systems, conduct 
signal jamming, or collect intelligence; it can also be used as a defensive counterspace weapon to 
serve as a “host” satellite. Additionally, the satellite may be used for benign purposes, such as 
conducting refueling, cleaning up debris, or being used as a technology demonstrator for human 
spaceflight missions.288 It has even been suggested that developing a satellite capable of active 
debris cleanup is a method of simultaneously developing ASAT capabilities without arousing 
global outcry.289 
China currently operates five technology demonstration programs that further its knowledge 
of RPOs. However, it has not conducted a destructive intercept of a target and there is no 
definitive proof that these programs have direct counterspace purposes.290 Western observers 
first raised the alarm in 2008, when the BX-1 (hosting a photo imaging payload) was released 
from the Shenzhou-7 capsule during a spacewalk. It conducted limited proximity operations 
around the capsule, then appeared to maneuver in order to conduct an intentional flyby of ISS.291 
Although further assessment has concluded that the ISS flyby was benign, it has raised concerns 
that the test could give China the operational and technical expertise necessary to develop a co-
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orbital ASAT.292 In 2010, the SJ-12 conducted a series of RPO maneuvers with a target payload 
(SJ-06F) culminating in a physical “bump” that caused perturbations in the satellites’ orbits.293 
Chinese media stated that the SJ-12 was “designed for carrying out scientific and technological 
experiments including space environment probe, measurement and communications.”294 
However, some American experts believe that its true mission is intelligence collection, while 
others view it as a precursor to the first docking of a Shenzhou space capsule with the Tiangong-
1 space station in the following year.295 They remain in disagreement as to whether it represents 
a significant ASAT capability.296  
 The Chinese RPO demonstration that has caused the most consternation among American 
observers is a series of maneuvers conducted by the SY-7, CX-3 and SJ-15 satellites, starting in 
2013. One of the satellites was equipped with a robotic arm built by the Chinese Academy of 
Space Technology (CAST) that was designed to capture a micro target satellite.297 They 
conducted a series of tests over multiple years, which may have resulted in a successful 
grapple.298 It has been suggested that the SY-7’s robotic arm was a predecessor of an arm 
destined to be launched aboard China’s large space station (slated for launch in 2020 or beyond), 
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a test of space maintenance capabilities, or an experiment on the collection of space debris.299 
Alternatively, Pentagon officials believe that it is a test of China’s secret ASAT program and 
represents a real concern for U.S. national defense.300 This is a case study for the differentiation 
problem in space. It was most likely developed to be a stepping stone in the Chinese manned 
space program, but was also built by a military contractor with military capabilities also in 
mind.301 Similarly, the Aolong-1 (The Roaming Dragon) was built by CAST and launched in 
2016. Its mission is to rendezvous with a “non-cooperative” target to collect man-made debris in 
space, but CAST researchers noted that the Chinese military acknowledges its usefulness as an 
ASAT technology.302 However, its purpose as either a weapon, junk collector, or technology 
demonstrator for the space station has not been established and remains hotly debated.303 This 
demonstrates that differentiation in space is largely accomplished by examining intent rather than 
technological specifications. 
 The line between offensive and defensive technologies does not get clearer when 
comparing BMD and ASAT technologies. From the point of view of arms control and policy, 
ASAT technology and BMD are near polar opposites, but technological similarities means that 
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BMD and ASAT systems are functionally interchangeable.304 The United States has 
demonstrated the ability to use the SM-3, which is part of the ship mobile Aegis BMD system, to 
destroy satellites in LEO.305 The Ground Based Interceptor system deployed to Alaska and 
California have not demonstrated the ability to function as an ASAT system, but the program 
could have greater potential as an ASAT system than the SM-3.306 China’s test of BMD and 
ASAT capabilities are also closely linked. The SC-19 System was tested twice before it 
intercepted the Chinese FY-1C weather satellite as an ASAT demonstration.307 The SC-19 (DN-
01) was tested again in 2010, 2013, 2014, and possibly 2018, with each of these tests involving 
the interception of a ballistic missile.308 Since the debris-creating 2007 ASAT test, which caused 
significant public outrage, China has been careful to frame SC-19 testing as peaceful, defensive 
BMD tests.309 The DN-02 and DN-03 variants also intercepted ballistic targets and were framed 
as BMD tests, but American officials are adamant that these are continued tests of ASAT 
capabilities.310 Again, due to the difficulty of differentiating BMD from ASAT technology, 
American strategists cannot rely on technological nuance to determine if China’s recent tests 
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represent an expansion of offensive or defensive capabilities. Rather, they must surmise Chinese 
intent, which is exponentially more difficult. 
It is estimated that 95% of space technology has dual use for both civilian and military 
purposes.311 For example, research in rocketry during the Cold War was originally used to 
deliver nuclear weapons but became the forbearer of technology that supported the Apollo 
program, and more recently allowed middle school students to launch a satellite into a polar 
orbit.312 Very few technologies are inherently military or civilian. Therefore, in the majority of 
cases, civilian and military differentiation cannot be accomplished via function alone. This 
creates a conundrum where the U.S. is forced to choose between attempting to control all space 
technology, lest it be used by China, or maintaining a monopoly on only a small number of 
technologies vital to national security. It has continually chosen the former.313  
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Table 2: A more complete list of space technologies with their civilian and military uses. 314 
Generic Technology 
Application 
Civil Use Military Use Dual Use? 
Communications Satellites Fixed Satellite service Fixed satellite service Yes 
 Broadcasting satellite 
service 
Broadcasting satellite 
service 
Yes 
 Mobile satellite Service Mobile satellite service Yes 
 Land, maritime, and 
aeronautical mobile 
intersatellite services 
Land, maritime, and 
aeronautical mobile 
intersatellite services 
Yes 
Remote Sensing Earth resource observations Reconnaissance systems Yes 
 Environmental monitoring Environmental Monitoring Yes 
 Atmospheric research  No 
 Geophysics  Precision targeting Yes 
 Oceanography Oceanography Yes 
 Cartography Cartography Yes 
  Nuclear test detection and 
surveillance 
No 
  Early-warning system No 
 Treaty compliance 
verification 
Treaty compliance 
verification 
Yes 
Satellite navigation 
systems 
Navigation services  Navigation services  Yes 
Rocket Propulsion Space launch systems Space launch systems Yes 
 Propulsion systems Propulsion Systems Yes 
 Reaction and control 
systems 
Reaction and control 
systems 
Yes 
  Ballistic missiles No 
  Anti-ballistic missiles No 
 Interceptor propulsion and 
grappling systems 
Interceptor propulsion and 
grappling systems 
Yes 
Search and Rescue 
Systems 
Search and rescue services Search and rescue services Yes 
Space science and 
exploration 
General space science  No 
 Manned observation and 
mission staging  
Manned observation and 
mission staging 
Yes 
 
The registration convention dictates that launched objects are registered with the UN 
containing, at a minimum: name of launching state, designator, basic orbital parameters, and 
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general function.315 With this information, it is easy to determine which systems are directly 
owned and operated by a state’s military and intelligence apparatus. However, military use of 
civilian satellite systems and vice versa confounds even this apparently simple distinction. The 
first U.S. PNT system (NAVSTAR) was launched in 1974 with military navigation and nuclear 
detection missions, followed by 11 more satellites between 1978 and 1985. However, President 
Reagan opened the data for civilian use, ostensibly in reaction to the Russian shoot-down of 
Korean Air flight 007.316 Since that time, PNT has become integrated into the global economy 
by providing location based services; enabling navigation for roads, aviation, rails, and maritime 
environments; providing precision agriculture and surveying; aiding in construction and mining; 
and for precise timing and time synchronization used in broadcasting, mobile phones, and 
internet transactions.317 U.S. economic benefit from NAVSTAR is conservatively estimated at 
$68.7B and global economic benefit around $260B.318 Civilian and military use of PNT is 
intertwined to the point where attacks that cause widespread signal degradation could risk 
horizontal escalation. Likewise, disabling NAVSTAR for tactical operations risks escalating the 
conflict to the strategic level, due to importance of the system to the U.S. economy.  
 To further complicate the dual use problem, the U.S. DoD has expressed an interest in 
hosting military payloads on both commercial and non-U.S. satellites. In 2011, the Air Force 
                                                 
315 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, New York, 12 November 1974, available 
from http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/registration-convention.html. 
316 Mark Sullivan, “A Brief History of GPS,” PC World, August 9, 2012, 
https://www.pcworld.com/article/2000276/a-brief-history-of-gps.html. 
317 Irv Leveson, “The Economic Benefits of GPS,” GPSWorld, September 1, 2015, 
https://www.gpsworld.com/the-economic-benefits-of-gps/. 
318 Irv Leveson, GPS Civilian Economic Value to the U.S., Interim Report (Beltsville, MD: National Executive 
Committee for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing, ASRC Federal Research and Technology 
Solutions, Inc., August 2015), 68; Report is an extremely comprehensive analysis of the U.S. NAVSTAR market. 
For discussion on the civilian application and value of PNT in general and NAVSTAR in particular, this is a 
fantastic resource. 
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created the Hosted Payload Office to facilitate matching government payloads with hosts and has 
launched three payloads on commercial assets, with more on the way.319 During the 2018 Space 
Symposium, Secretary of the Air Force, Heather Wilson, announced plans to host DoD payloads 
on partner nations’ satellites, including Australia, Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, 
and Japan. Secretary Wilson was clear that the intent of the policy was to change the decision 
calculus of potential aggressors.320 Months later, the United States Government Accountability 
Office published a report recommending that the DoD continues to pursue hosted payloads in 
order to streamline the acquisitions process and provide increased strategic resiliency.321 The 
2018 Joint Chiefs of Staff publication on Space Operations listed utilizing commercial assets to 
increase space mission assurance by providing resiliency and diversification from military 
owned assets.322 For that reason, targeting a payload owned and operated by the U.S. military 
will increasingly involve attacking commercial and partner nations’ assets by proxy.  
Additionally, military organizations buy key services from commercial space providers. 
The same Joint Chiefs document listed reliance on commercial space systems for communication 
and imagery as a key DoD dependency.323 Prior to September 11, 2001, DoD satellite 
communication (SATCOM) demands were largely filled internally and relied on commercial 
                                                 
319 Government Accountability Office, DOD’s Use of Commercial Satellites to Host Defense Payloads Would 
Benefit from Centralizing Data (Washington: Government Accountability Office, July 2018), 8-13; Three payloads 
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environment. Three scheduled launches are Spacebased Kill Assessment (SKA) used by the MDA, Phoenix 
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a polar tactical communication payload. 
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SATCOM for surge capability; however, DoD reliance on commercial SATCOM has increased 
800 percent since then.324 Current estimates are that more than 80% of DoD SATCOM 
bandwidth is purchased from commercial companies, with demand continuing to grow and no 
military capability slated to fill demand.325  
Commercial remote sensing data is more controversial and more complicated than 
commercial communications. The Land-Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 
authorized the Secretary of Commerce to market Landsat data commercially and allowed for the 
licensing of private remote-sensing space systems.326 It was replaced by the Land Remote 
Sensing Policy Act of 1992, which added language that requires privately licensed companies to 
comply with national security concerns.327 Since then, multiple high-resolution imagery satellites 
have launched under U.S. license, with Digital Globe/GeoEye currently monopolizing the U.S. 
market. Due to the classification of DoD imaging satellites, it is difficult to precisely gauge how 
reliant the U.S. is on commercial data, though a good indicator is that the U.S. government 
accounts for half of GeoEye’s revenue and heavily subsidizes its technology development.328 
                                                 
324 Government Accountability Office, Defense Satellite Communications: DoD Needs Additional Information 
to Improve Procurements (Washington: Government Accountability Office, 2015), 9; This is even more impressive 
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Given this cross-flow of data between DoD, civilian, and private agencies, civilian/military 
differentiation by owner is also muddled. 
 As commercial imaging capabilities continue to improve, they have greater utility in 
terms of military intelligence. 329  
Table 3: Privately owned, commercially available high and medium resolution imaging satellites 
and their capabilities. 330 
Country of 
Origin 
Operator Name Panchromatic  Multispectral 
United States DigitalGlobe (US) Worldview-1 50cm  
United States DigitalGlobe (US) Worldview-2 46cm 1.84m 
United States DigitalGlobe (US) Worldview-3 31cm 1.24m 
United States DigitalGlobe (US) Worldview-4 30cm  
United States DigitalGlobe (US) GeoEye-1 41cm 1.65m 
France Spot (FR) Pleiades-1 
Pleiades-2 
50cm 2m 
France Spot (FR) SPOT-6 
SPOT-7 
1.5m 6m 
Germany Planet Labs (US) RapidEye 1-5 5m  
United States Planet Labs (US) Dove x88  3-5m 
United States Planet Labs (US) SkySat 1-15 72cm 1m 
India 21st Century 
(PRC) (Future) 
TripleSat 1-3 1m 4m 
 
 
                                                 
329 Laurance Nardon, Satellite Imagery Control: An American Dilemma (The Centre Français sur les Etats-Unis, 
2002), 15. 
330 Data from: Land Info Worldwide Mapping LLC, http://www.landinfo.com/satellite-imagery-pricing.html; 
also, Gunter’s Space Page, https://space.skyrocket.de/index.html. This does not include government owned systems 
whose data is commercially available. 
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Table 4: Resolution needed to observe military targets. 331 
 
                                                 
331 Nardon, Satellite Imagery Control, 16. 
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The clear overlap between the resolution of commercially available images and the resolution 
needed for identification of military targets should be concerning for both players. It provides a 
source of high-quality intelligence that may be difficult to interdict for political reasons. The 
U.S. government has fought to restrict selling high resolution imaging data, but due to the 
proliferation of commercially available data and rapidly increasing capabilities, it has little 
choice but to make concessions, lest the U.S. private sector be left behind.332 For either player to 
deny high resolution data to the other, it must mitigate the other’s military collection capability, 
as well as its ability to purchase commercially available products; however, this capability is 
often provided under the license of third party nations. Again, this increases diplomatic 
complexity, limits credible threats, and risks horizontal escalation during a conflict. 
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III. Decisions Under Risk 
Thus far, this analysis has exclusively focused on the independent variable of systemic 
incentives that face China and the United States. This classical realist’s approach takes into 
account only relative material power capabilities and assumes perfect rationality within a state’s 
decision making apparatus. These variables set the bounds of state behavior and account for 
long-term trends, but their impact on foreign policy in the short and medium term is ultimately 
indirect and complex. Rather, systemic pressures and external variables must be translated 
through intervening variables at the unit level in order to undertake robust predictive analysis.333 
If statesmen in China and the United States were to correctly identify the structural security 
dilemma at play and trust the other to do the same, the dilemma would be relatively easy to 
diffuse. In a world with perfect rationality, mutual confidence building initiatives would be 
received well and increase the incentive for cooperation. Likewise, a tit-for-tat strategy could 
increase the cost of defection without risk of escalation. The zero-sum assumption crumbles 
under the belief that the recognition of shared goals and security for all players is not a mutually 
exclusive event.  
However, decision makers tend to act in terms of the vulnerability they feel, which often 
differs from the reality of relative material power dynamics.334 A state’s subjective security 
demands are a compilation of psychological biases, cultural values, and historical factors that can 
alter the utility of outcomes described by a realist’s analysis of the security dilemma.335 A player 
will act rationally in the sense that is chooses the course of action that it believe provides the 
                                                 
333 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 146. 
334 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 174. 
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greatest payoff. Whether or not their belief is in alignment with the “ideal” depends on how their 
perception is affected by motivated and unmotivated biases.336 This is the basis for the 
neoclassical realist assumption of bounded rationality over the realist assumption of perfect 
rationality. Therefore, a fundamental question should be: does a perceptual security dilemma 
accompany the structural security dilemma?  
A series of biases stemming from inherent cognitive fallacies fundamentally alters the 
perception of risk, reward, and probability. This leads statesmen to underestimate the extent to 
which their actions threaten other states, overestimate the compatibility of their own goals with 
an opponent’s goals, and misinterpret signals from an opponent. These misperceptions 
exacerbate the problem at the core of the security dilemma: a player believes that the other player 
prefers defection, while they themselves are trying to cooperate.337 Additionally, a series of 
biases stemming from a system of beliefs and cultural factors (strategic culture) alters a player’s 
perception of utility.338 Due to the diversity of strategic cultures among the world’s states, player 
preferences are likely to diverge from realist predictions that measure relative material power 
alone. Therefore, it is imperative to account for cognitive biases and cultural belief systems in 
order to determine the extent to which they modify the security dilemma presented in previous 
chapters.339 Furthermore, preconceptions about an opponent limit the imagination and empathy 
necessary for the correct appreciation of threats.340 Conversely, a shared value system (or at least 
                                                 
336 Bonnie Triezenberg, “Deterring Space War,” 21. 
337 Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” 337-338. 
338 Howard, “Strategic Culture,” 1-6; Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” 340-344; Strategic 
culture refers to a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and 
particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force. This 
is derived from history, geography, and political culture.  
339 See Jervis, Nebow, and Stein Psychology and Deterrence chapters 1 & 2 for the impact of unmotivated 
biases on decision making in international relations. 
340 Jervis, Nebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, 19-22. 
 100 
 
cultural understanding) dampens the zero-sum assumption that drives the security dilemma by 
causing one player to value the wellbeing of the other.341 
A. China under Prospect Theory 
A. Decisions under risk 
The primary unmotivated bias that causes players to violate expected utility theory is the 
tendency to improperly value outcome while under risk. This is known as prospect theory, 
first published in 1979 by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. They found that players 
view outcomes in terms of deviation from a reference point, meaning that they perceive 
outcomes as gains or losses rather than final states. They demonstrated that players generally 
prefer a smaller, but more certain gain when compared to a larger, though less certain gain. 
Players will violate expected utility by choosing a non-optimal course of action because they 
value certainty, creating a loss aversion when in the domain of gains. However, when 
confronted with losses, the outcome is reflected. Players generally prefer to risk a larger, but 
uncertain loss when compared to a smaller, but more certain loss. In the domain of losses, 
players are violating expected utility because they become risk seeking. A function of value 
and gains under perfect rationality is linear. However, loss aversion in the domain of gains 
and risk seeking in the domain of losses, combined with the diminishing returns of both gains 
and losses as a player gets further away from its reference point, results in convex and 
concave regions of a value curve. As a player in the domain of losses moves further from its 
reference, it will accept increasingly high amounts of risk for the prospect of a return to the 
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reference. Conversely, when a player in the domain of gains moves further from its 
reference, they are less likely to accept risk for an identical gain.342  
 
Figure 13: Value function under prospect theory. 343 
In international relations, an actor’s reference point is set at the relative power status they 
feel entitled to, which is based on prior standing or aspirational goals.344 The dissonance 
between its reference point and the current status quo will determine whether it is operating 
in a domain of gains or domain of losses. If an actor is satisfied with the status quo, it will be 
in the domain of gains. A state in the domain of gains forgoes the opportunity to improve its 
position (which would entail accepting additional risk), opting for the certainty of the status 
quo. If a state is dissatisfied with the status quo, it will be in the domain of losses. A state in 
the domain of losses will accept additional risk in order to improve its relative position, 
rather than accept the unfavorable status quo.345 As a result, the security dilemma is 
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heightened when one or both states are in the domain of losses but dampened when both are 
in a domain of gains.  
When structural asymmetry exists (one player being in a domain of gains and the other in 
a domain of losses), it results in a fundamentally unstable relationship that creates a security 
dilemma.346 The dilemma can be exacerbated when there is dissonance between the structural 
realities of relative power and the perception of one’s rightful place within the international 
system. The rising power believes that its newly found (or rediscovered) material power 
entitles it to an increased place in the international system. It is in the domain of losses 
seeking gains. The status quo power is hesitant to relinquish the hegemonic position and 
demands respect from the rising power. It is operating in the domain of gains, seeking 
stability. The slowly changing international system cannot incorporate the rising power into 
its schema rapidly enough, resulting in war between the status quo and rising power. This 
interplay between the structural factors of security dilemma and the psychological factors of 
prospect theory has been termed “Thucydidess’ Trap”.347 In the last 500 years, the 
international system has been subjected to the dynamics of Thucidides’s Trap 16 times; 12 of 
those incidents have resulted in a war between major powers.348 
Applying prospect theory to the Sino-U.S. security dilemma has worrying consequences 
if China is in a domain of losses and the United States is in a domain of gains. This results in 
a very important dynamic: under prospect theory, China is incentivized to upset the status 
quo, while the U.S. is incentivized to maintain it. This amplifies the outcomes of a scenario 
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where China defects and the U.S. cooperates. The security dilemma is deepened because the 
benefits of defection are more attractive for China and U.S. losses are exaggerated. At the 
same time, China’s benefit from cooperation is decreased because it has little to gain from 
maintaining its current position. In all cases, China’s incentives to defect are increased. 
 
  
 
Without Prospect 
Theory 
 
China 
  C D 
U.S. 
C 6,3 -5,8 
D 8, -10 -3,-1 
   
 
With Prospect 
Theory 
 
China 
  C D 
U.S. 
C 8,1 -7,10 
D 6,-6 -5, 0 
Figure 14 Game under prospect theory. Prospect theory strengthens the structural security 
dilemma observed in Chapter II. 
B. China and the “Century of Humiliation” 
China has existed for millennia, less as a nation-state and more of a permanent natural 
phenomenon whose protected geography and unique cultural unity have resulted in a nearly 
continuous existence in unification. Throughout the long existence of this geographic entity, 
periods of disunity and turmoil were treated as an aberration.349 Although external threats were 
present throughout China’s history, its ability to deflect, absorb, or conquer barbarians while 
simultaneously maintaining unity created China’s identity as an enduring, universal entity.350 
This idea, combined with its historical economic preeminence, led to the belief in China’s 
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centrality. China was not a civilization; it is civilization, the “Middle Kingdom” with all other 
societies assessed as graduations from it.351  
It is unsurprising that Confucianism took root in this environment. Confucianism is a 
conservative philosophy that values recognition of hierarchy, social harmony and internal 
stability, observation of “correct” conduct, and a desire for isolation.352 The Confucian 
philosophy is evident in Chinese diplomatic relations. China rarely engaged in balance of power 
diplomacy because it viewed itself as the Central Kingdom, dominating All Under Heaven. Due 
to this centrality, it was not required to deal with other states on the basis of equality due to its 
hegemonic position in East Asia.353 Furthermore, Confucianism has pervaded all aspects of 
Chinese culture and is not conducive to democratic rule.354 Rather, the sovereign possesses the 
“Mandate of Heaven”, lost only if it shows signs of weakness and is usurped by a stronger ruler, 
who would then possess the same mandate.355 Through periods of isolation, political turmoil, and 
chaos, the state ultimately survives and returns to equilibrium. The Cultural Revolution under 
Mao sought to destroy China’s Confucian tradition; but today China remains Maoist in name 
only, while Confucian tradition is resurgent. 
He [Mao] was passionately and publicly anti-Confusion, yet he read widely in Chinese 
classics and was wont to quote from the ancient texts…Maoist governance thus turned into a 
version of the Confucian tradition through the looking glass, proclaiming a total break with 
the past while relying on many of China’s traditional institutions, including an imperial style 
                                                 
351 Kissinger, On China, 10-11. 
352 Johnson Freese, The Chinese Space Program, 14-15. 
353 Kissinger, On China, 16-17. 
354 Joan Johnson Freese, The Chinese Space Program, 23-24. 
355 Thomas Drohan, A New Strategy for Complex Warfare, 25. 
 105 
 
of governance; the state as an ethical project; and a mandarin bureaucracy that Mao loathed, 
periodically destroyed, and in the end, equally periodically was obliged to re-create.356  
 The latest era of turmoil and uncertainty began with The First Opium War. It ushered in a 
110 year era between 1839 and 1949 where Western military and diplomatic advantage allowed 
for unprecedented imperialist intervention in China, known as the “century of humiliation”. 
Military superiority allowed Western diplomats to impose a series of unequal trade agreements, 
resulting in the opening of Chinese markets to foreign trade. These treaties contradicted the idea 
that China was the Central Kingdom and all other states are tributaries within China’s sphere of 
influence. Furthermore, foreign intervention led to the erosion of Chinese territorial integrity. 
Treaties with Western nations forced cession of a number of territories, including Hong Kong; 
Japanese military invasion led to China losing control over parts of Manchuria and Taiwan; and 
independence movements in Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang led to further reductions in China’s 
territory. Additionally, this era was punctuated with severe internal turmoil that destroyed the 
traditional imperial government and killed millions.357 Western imperialism in China was not 
focused on territorial conquest, nor did it seek to administer Chinese territory, but it did force 
China to accept a world order fundamentally incompatible with its existing one.358 China was no 
longer the Middle Kingdom, but a tributary of the West. During the century of humiliation, 
China became far removed from its historic reference point as the Middle Kingdom. 
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 The Century of Humiliation ended with national unification under Mao. Since then, 
China’s economy has experienced massive growth, surpassing the U.S. as the world’s largest 
economy by many metrics.359 Despite this meteoric return to economic preeminence and an 
apparently stable internal hierarchy, China remains far from this historical reference point. The 
legacy from the Century of Humiliation remains deeply ingrained in the Chinese consciousness: 
“China is often portrayed as having suffered three kinds of loss during the Century of 
Humiliation: a loss of territory; a loss of control over its internal and external environment; and a 
loss of international standing and dignity. Each of these represents an injustice to be rectified.”360 
CCP leaders are aware of China’s tenuous internal balance and capacity for swift and radical 
change.361 Thus, rectifying these injustices, along with continuing economic prosperity, remains 
at the core of the CCP’s social contract.362 The CCP has portrayed itself as the protector of China 
against Western interference and the driver of its economic success.363 A new nationalist 
narrative (driven by the Central Propaganda Department) has emerged that is less about 
celebrating China’s strength than commemorating its weakness; it is based in restoring China as 
a nation worthy of the designator “Middle Kingdom” and reclaiming the rightful place of China 
in the international system.364 For this reason, China can be said to operate in a domain of losses 
seeking gains. 
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C. Chinese Space Program and Techno-nationalism 
 Although utilization of the space domain is a recent phenomenon when compared to the 
ancient Chinese empire, this does not preclude Sino-U.S. space competition from the tenants of 
prospect theory. Rather, similar patterns can be identified in Sino-U.S. space relations because it 
is an essential marker of national technological, economic, and military capabilities. Not only 
does a vibrant space program yield significant material advantage, it demonstrates a nation’s 
ability to mobilize its science and technology infrastructure for a unified purpose and advances a 
clear nationalist narrative.365 A 2016 white paper on China’s space activities stated that a 
cornerstone of Chinese space policy was “to provide strong support for the realization of the 
Chinese Dream of the renewal of the Chinese nation.”366 Not only is the development of China 
linked to that of its space program, China aims to become a space power that can compete with 
the United States and Russia. In his 2016 Space Dream speech, president Xi Jinping expressed 
that China aspires to become a space giant, an aerospace power.367 There is good evidence that 
China is using the development of its space program to rectify its losses during the Century of 
Humiliation.368 Although Chinese scientists and bureaucrats may not be in agreement as to the 
primary goal of the program, they agree that all three losses are addressed by the Chinese space 
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program.369 First, China’s civilian space program is a powerful soft power tool used to improve 
its international standing. Second, China’s ambitious space exploration plans can be related to its 
expansionism, territoriality and resource nationalism in the terrestrial domain. Third, ambitious 
space exploration achievements would give China legitimacy to reshape international norms. 
Fourth, the focus on space weapons development may be an attempt to generate a RMA to upset 
the status quo of U.S. military superiority.  
a. Spaceflight and National Prestige 
 Although many milestones of the Chinese space program were first accomplished by the 
U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War, China has adopted a series of ambitious space 
policy objectives designed to prove that China is Asia’s science and technology leader, and that 
they are able to compete on the international stage.370 In particular, China is pursuing manned 
spaceflight milestones as an instrument of soft power. These profoundly public demonstrations 
are valuable in terms of displaying regional leadership, improving China’s reputation in the field 
of high technologies, and attracting young engineering talent.371 China’s civilian space program 
has two notable advantages. First, it spends $2-3 billion annually (0.05% of GDP), compared to 
NASA’s yearly budget of $19 million (0.10% of GDP).372 The notable spending indicates that 
China’s accomplishments have occurred at a discounted rate and, as long as China’s economy 
continues to grow, budgets have room to expand as well. Second, due to the continuity of CCP 
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leadership, China is able to utilize consistent policy, long-term planning, and incremental 
development, which are requisite for a successful space program.373 
 The power of incrementalism has been evident in the last decade as each major milestone 
has served as a building block for the program. The first Chinese astronaut was launched in 2003 
aboard the Shenzhou-5 (manned crew capsule). The nation’s first spacewalk occurred in 2008 
aboard the Shenzhou-7. In 2012, the Shenzhou-9 docked with the Tiangong-1 (prototype space 
station) in order to demonstrate docking/undocking capability requisite for shuttling crews to and 
from a space station.374 October 2016 witnessed the docking of the Shenzhou-11 and the 
Tiangong-2, followed by a 30 day stay by Chinese astronauts that demonstrated the ability to 
assemble a station and support continual habitation that is projected to begin in 2022.375 China’s 
5 year goals outlined in the 2016 space white paper have been mostly achieved. The Tianzhou-1 
(automated resupply capsule) conducted a series of tests with the Tiangong-2 that demonstrated 
the ability to resupply astronauts during their stay.376 However, the rocky development of a 
heavy launch capability may postpone the entire deep space exploration, interplanetary, and 
manned spaceflight programs. An initial flight of the Long March 5 (heavy launch vehicle) in 
November 2016 was successful, but was followed by a notable setback when a July 2017 launch 
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experienced a first stage failure.377 The success of the return-to-flight scheduled for 2019 will 
likely determine the timelines for a mission to Mars originally scheduled for 2020, a lunar 
sample return mission slated for 2019, and the assembly of the Chinese space station.378 It may 
also determine the fate of the Long March 9 (Saturn V class booster), which is planned to 
conduct Martian sample return missions, manned lunar landings, and support the space solar 
power program.379  
 The relentless forward progress of the Chinese civilian space program demonstrates the 
dedication of CCP leadership to the program thus far. Watching their reaction to inevitable 
failures and delays in the program will be essential in gauging long-term dedication to competing 
with the U.S. It is clear that if CCP leadership maintains the prioritization of these programs 
through inevitable technical failures, cost overruns, and periods of economic uncertainty, they 
may very well supplant the United States as the world’s premier space power.380 U.S. policy 
makers should take Chinese timelines seriously, as well as gauge their geoeconomic 
ramifications, considering the consistency with which the Chinese space program has met its 
stated goals over the last half century.381 
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b. Resource Nationalism 
 Resource nationalism is a state-led effort to exhibit mercantile control of natural 
resources through export restrictions, extraction control, taxation, and resource exploration, with 
the expressed intent of benefiting one’s own geoeconomic position. This is broadly brought 
about by increased resource demand caused by growing populations and industries, uneven 
distribution of resources, and an uncertain global trade environment.382 Being the largest mining 
economy in the world, China has had the opportunity to engage in resource nationalism through 
targeted export restriction and heavy resource extraction in the Tibetan region.383 China’s 
expanded resource extraction efforts in the South China Sea go hand-in-hand with its claims of 
national sovereignty in the region.384 Apart from its sovereignty claims, China has been 
aggressively exploring the international resource extraction market, with emphasis on Africa, 
South America, and the Arctic.385 Given China’s assertive behavior with regard to “lost 
territories,” intertwined with the idea of national resources, it is possible that China’s quest for 
space-based resources would be informed by a similar logic.386 
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 With recent advances in space technology, space may be the next location of a resource 
scramble.387 Given heavy initial investment and two decades to establish an asteroid mining 
infrastructure, it is possible to make a very lucrative profit and significantly impact the world’s 
supply of platinum group metals (PGMs). This is of significant note as earth-based resources 
become increasingly scarce.388 Effective space mining operations from even a single asteroid 
could have disruptive effects on the global iron, nickel, PGM, and precious metal economies, 
especially if that supply is controlled by a single state.389 A small bastion of China experts 
believe that its exploration and exploitation of space will mirror its resource extraction initiatives 
on earth, that current space science efforts are heavily biased towards exploring and exploiting 
natural resources in near earth objects and the moon.390 They argue the manned space program is 
building towards a permanent presence on the moon, which would serve as a focal point for the 
expansion of resource extraction efforts. 391 Mining the moon itself is unlikely to prove 
profitable.392 However, given a large scale operation, in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) from the 
moon can significantly reduce the cost of asteroid mining efforts in the long term through 
propellant synthesis.393 Additionally, the utilization of lunar ISRU could be a viable (even cost 
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saving) alternative to NASA’s Human Exploration of Mars Design Reference Architecture for 
manned lunar expeditions.394 
 The Chinese lunar program (Chang’e) has made great progress in the last decade. The 
Chang’e-2, launched in October 2010, conducted a flyby of an asteroid and surveyed the lunar 
surface for future missions.395 In 2013 the Chang’e-3 was the first spacecraft since the Soviet 
Luna-24 mission in 1976 to conduct a soft landing on the moon. Although the lunar rover was 
only partially successful, it was a significant step in the Chinese lunar program.396 The program 
matched its goal of landing the Chang’e 4 lunar probe on the far side of the moon, which was 
outlined in the 2016 white paper.397 This success prompted the revelation of a more ambitious 
plan to launch at least four additional lunar probes, plans for the construction of a moon base, 
and confirmation that the projected 2020 Mars probe was still on schedule.398 Ye Peijian, chief 
commander and designer of China’s lunar exploration program, announced plans to capture an 
asteroid and bring it into lunar orbit by 2020 with the expressed intent of mining.399 Establishing 
a lunar base, mining asteroids, and establishing a presence on Mars are three simultaneous, 
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interrelated lines of effort; therefore, it remains to be seen whether China’s lunar focus is a base 
for resource nationalism, a jumping off point for more prestige oriented missions to Mars, or 
both. However, both are consistent with the risky, speculative, but high payoff projects expected 
of a power that is in the domain of losses seeking gains. 
c. The New Space Law Régime  
 Compared with economic and military heft, institutional power takes time to 
cultivate. As China produces ever more scientists, academics, and professionals who 
operate at the cutting edge of their fields, increasing numbers of these individuals will 
take on positions of influence in institutions around the world and even create institutions 
of their own. China’s ability to influence the regional and global discourse on a wide 
range of issues will increase correspondingly. In areas like cyber and space, where 
international norms have yet to be settled upon, this growth in institutional soft power 
will be particularly valuable.400 
This is especially true concerning space law and policy, whose development was essentially a 
continuation of U.S. Cold War strategy. The space law régime maintained the delicate balance of 
power between the Soviet Union and the United States, allowing for the seamless incorporation 
of another competitive domain into the context of great power competition. Therefore, U.S. 
space strategy was aimed at the establishment of a legal regime that complemented the American 
propaganda line of openness and cooperation. It simultaneously preserved American freedom to 
pursue military missions in space that were needed to protect and perfect the nuclear deterrent.401 
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The use of the word “peaceful” rather than “nonmilitary” allowed for widespread use of military 
space assets, which was essential for maintaining the deterrent balance during the Cold War.402 
The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) became dominated by the U.S. 
and Soviet Union, and has been effective in keeping the space law régime favorable to the major 
powers.403 The initial development of space law was not intended to be a boon for collective 
humanity, rather it began as an instrument for great powers to maintain the global status quo. 
Although China has recently acquired the means to compete with the United States and Russia as 
a great spacefaring power, there are vestiges in current international law that run counter to 
China’s interest. This may not have been the case if China had been given a stake in its 
development.404 The debate over the concept of res communis in space law is an example of the 
consternation this has caused between less developed countries and the major spacefaring powers 
(i.e. the United States and Soviet Union).405 Recent technological advancement and a changing 
geopolitical environment has led to debate about the fundamental soundness of the OST.406 
 In addition to China having very little say in the current space law régime, it has also 
been isolated by U.S. space policy. The perception that China intends to use space technology 
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largely for military purposes has undermined its reputation and role as a responsible space actor 
in the international community. Its reputation is largely responsible for a series of export control 
measures by the United States that have resulted in a bottleneck in China’s efforts to expand its 
space cooperation.407 The first major blow to cooperative efforts between China and the U.S. 
occurred in the reactionary wake of the factually dubious 1999 Cox Committee Report and the 
1998 Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.408 
This effort has resulted in China developing indigenous technologies, creating a market for ITAR 
free products, and creating a new generation of Chinese intellectuals resentful and suspicious of 
the U.S.409 However, bilateral efforts were beginning to produce civilian space cooperation until 
2011, when a House bill prevented congressionally appropriated funds from being used by 
NASA or the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy “to develop, design, plan, 
promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to 
participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China”.410 This rendered Sino-
U.S. cooperation essentially nonexistent and eliminated the possibility of Chinese participation 
with the ISS program, which they would have readily accepted.411  
 That being said, China’s own policy decisions are mixed in regards to international 
cooperation. China’s 2007 DAASAT test either indicated that it does not fundamentally 
understand the risk that kinetic ASAT weapons pose to the continued use of space, that it simply 
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did not care about the risk to the space domain, or that the civilian leadership is disconnected 
from PLA decision making. The inconsistency and opaqueness of China’s space policy decision 
making stymies international outreach. Furthermore, military control of civilian space program is 
problematic for China’s space science community when it seeks to build lasting relationships 
with other spacefaring nations. These factors make China a difficult target for transparency and 
confidence-building measures (TCBMs) that could set the basis for a mutually beneficial space 
law régime. Also, China has arguably violated the spirit of the OST with its 2006 lasing of a 
NRO payload or its 2007 ASAT test. Therefore, any concessions that the U.S. makes while 
renegotiating its space policy with regards to China should seek to increase China’s 
transparency, reduce the role of the PLA in its civilian space program, and ensure non-
interference with U.S. space assets. 
 At the same time, China has demonstrated that it is willing to work within the framework 
of the existing international space law regime and utilize established methods of introducing and 
changing international space law. The development of Chinese domestic space law looks 
towards international law and the law of other states (the United States particularly) for 
precedent.412 China has sought an active role in the international space community. Its 2016 
white paper stated the desire for cooperation and peaceful development and it has been an 
important participant in the UNCOPUOS and the Conference on Disarmament (CD).413 China 
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and Russia jointly submitted the Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in 
Outer Space and of the Threat of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) to bring the letter 
of international law more in line with the spirit of the OST.414 The PPWT failed to garner U.S. 
support because it did not ban ground-based ASATs, which led to concern that it was a method 
for China and Russia to gain military advantage over the U.S.415 Although this effort failed, it 
served to revive the debate about a treaty on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space 
(PAROS) and serves as an example of China working within the current space law régime to 
achieve policy goals.416 Although the purpose of the PPWT was to paint China and Russia in a 
positive light and highlight the U.S.’s militarization of space, the fact that China introduced the 
legislation through the established legal framework rather than taking unilateral or bilateral 
action is significant.  
 China’s willingness to interact with the current space law régime can be attributed to the 
regime’s weakness, rather than its representativeness of China’s interests. The most important 
ramification of the weak space law régime is the opportunity for China to set customary 
international law or, at the very least, guide the interpretation of existing law as it is applied to 
new space exploration milestones. The prevailing interpretation of the OST has defined the 
ambiguous “peaceful purposes” to mean non-aggression rather than non-militarization. This has 
resulted in the United States gaining military freedom of action in the domain and has raised 
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worries about the U.S.’s desire to dominate space through weaponization.417 Similarly, 
international law is notably ambiguous and open to interpretation concerning space mining and 
resource utilization.418 This represents an opportunity to work within the current system to 
produce an outcome consistent with China’s long-term goals.419 Due to the rapid technological 
advancements in space, the codified space law régime often does not adapt to keep pace with 
international practices; rather, established practices often precede and inform the creation of 
international law.420 China has the opportunity to shape international space law if it can jump to 
the forefront of space exploration, particularly if it is able to be the first to conduct ISRU or 
space mining. Considering this, a space race may be less about prestige and more about 
reshaping international space law, an undeniably appealing prospect to a nation in the domain of 
losses.  
d. Space Weapons for a Revolution in Military Affairs 
RMAs occur when a transformational technology accompanied by sound tactics, 
organization, strategy, leadership, training, and national infrastructure produces an innovative 
warfighting approach that has a disruptive effect on the current military paradigm.421 
Revolutionary organizations and weapons that have low financial/high organizational cost are 
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particularly dangerous to the existing status quo.422 The PLA was profoundly impacted by the 
U.S. military’s integration of information systems to produce battlefield effects, starting with the 
Gulf War. The common consensus was that the U.S. had ushered in a RMA that could not be 
ignored when building a 21st century military.423 Luckily for China, these paradigm shifting 
observations came at a time when the PLA was beginning rapid military modernization and 
revitalization enabled by massive economic growth. The PLA officers overseeing this transition 
witnessed the late-20th century American military at its most effective during a critical point of 
their professional development. These officers realized that a facsimile of the American way of 
war was untenable. Rather, they are developing weapons, organizations, and doctrine that seek to 
avoid American shortcomings and adapt Chinese strategic culture for information warfare.424 
Therefore, the threat that China may pose to American military superiority lies not in replication 
of currently employed tactics, but in their disruption. Chinese military doctrine designed to 
produce this disruption is focused on system-versus-system warfare in multiple domains. Its goal 
is to wage decisive, preemptive war using asymmetric weapons to attack enemy information 
systems in order to create a temporary, localized advantage, enabling the accomplishment of 
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political objectives. The implementation of sophisticated, high-tech space weapons and evolved 
space doctrine are a large piece of fighting an informationalized war.425 
A white paper on China’s Military Strategy, published in 2015, was prefaced by the 
importance of RMA. 
The world RMA is proceeding to a new stage. Long-range, precise, smart, stealthy and 
unmanned weapons and equipment are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Outer space 
and cyber space have become new commanding heights in strategic competition among 
all parties. The form of war is accelerating its evolution to informationization. World 
major powers are actively adjusting their national security strategies and defense policies, 
and speeding up their military transformation and force restructuring. The 
aforementioned revolutionary changes in military technologies and the form of war have 
not only had a significant impact on the international political and military landscapes, 
but also posed new and severe challenges to China’s military security.426 
The white paper calls for a logistics modernization in order to mobilize national resources, 
development of innovative weapons through thorough civil-military integration, reformed 
training of military personnel, and the development of doctrine and strategy that focuses on a 
dynamic operating environment and capability integration.427 These are all key ingredients of a 
RMA. China has sought to make organizational changes in order to support this military 
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strategy; shortly after the 2015 white paper was published, a major organizational restructuring 
took place within the PLA.428 As a part of this restructuring, the Strategic Support Force (SSF) 
was created, a force which has no analog in the U.S. Military. Rather, it combines space, 
cyberspace, psychological, and electronic warfare into a unified force that conducts technology 
development, recruitment, and training for all three mission areas.429 This reorganization enables 
the doctrine of system-versus-system warfare and is consistent with an active defense strategy.430 
Overall, the SSF represents a revolutionary reorganization that could produce a significant 
disruption, but whose efficacy has yet to be tested. 
B. Availability  
During the decision making process, humans engage in shortcuts, judgements, and 
substitutions (known as heuristics) in order to simplify complex systems. Using heuristics leads 
to systematic errors, which in turn create biases.431 One bias observed under prospect theory is 
the tendency to overestimate small probabilities, which leads to overweighting the effect of rare 
events in decision making.432 Kahneman and Tversky suggest that the major mechanism at fault 
for this bias is the availability heuristic.433 This heuristic relies on human beings estimating the 
frequency of an event based on the ease with which similar events may be recalled. Events that 
are easy to construct or imagine will be perceived as occurring more frequently than those that 
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are more difficult to recall.434 Therefore, events with high emotional intensity, or whose memory 
is recalled with high frequency of repetition, become more available, resulting in an 
overestimation of the probability of their occurrence. An American policy maker whose 
academic education included frequent exposure to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and who 
can vividly recall Al-Qaeda’s attacks on September 11, 2001, may be prone to overestimating the 
frequency of these kind of catastrophic events.435  
Likewise, associative strength within a class of events can alter the judgement of an event’s 
frequency. When similarity exists between a highly available event in the past and a case under 
current consideration, there is a tendency to correlate the events. This leads to the expectation 
that what has happened in the past will reoccur.436 In addition to frequency or intensity of recall, 
availability is increased when associative bonds are formed between two events. For example, 
9/11 and Pearl Harbor are naturally simplified and grouped together despite significant 
differences. This leads to an increased likelihood that current conditions will be judged as a 
precursor to this class of event. When policy makers ignore the actual probability of an event 
occurring (base rate) due to heuristics, they are likely to judge others as having intentions that are 
rare or anticipate events that are very unlikely.437 In turn, they are likely to take measures (buy 
insurance) to reduce the probability that an undesirable event will occur.438 This can take the 
form of a buildup in latent military capability or forming alliances, which often have a 
paradoxical effect. 
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The United States is aware of the disruption that a new way of fighting war in space could 
bring; it is painfully aware of its reliance on space and the vulnerability that creates. A milestone 
Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and 
Organization (often known as the Rumsfeld Commission) makes five key assessments that have 
been largely influential on U.S. policy makers. First, space security should be a top national 
security priority due to the U.S. vulnerability in the domain. Second, a reorganization of space 
forces is required in order to keep up with evolving security demands. Third, military and 
intelligence infrastructures need to increase synergy. Fourth, conflict in the space domain is 
coming and the U.S. needs to be prepared. Fifth, revolutionary technologies are needed to 
maintain superiority in the domain.439 The commission recommends salient and relevant 
reorganization within the U.S. policy and military infrastructures, similar to the lines of effort 
China has undertaken with respect to RMA in the last two decades.  
The report embodies the U.S.’s hyperawareness to vulnerability when discussing that, “The 
U.S. is an attractive candidate for a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’” and names China explicitly as a 
candidate for carrying out such an attack.440 The provocatively phrased warning was quickly 
embraced by U.S. decision makers. The language of “space Pearl Harbor” to describe a 
catastrophic attack on U.S. capabilities has often been evoked by politicians, military leaders, 
and strategists since many in military leadership take a “when, not if” approach to space 
                                                 
439 Rumsfeld et al. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and 
Organization (Washington: Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and 
Organization, Committee on Armed Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, January 2001), 9-10. 
440 Rumsfeld et al., 13-14; The report specifically names China as trying to bring about RMA in space and calls 
out a conflict in the Taiwan Straits as one of three scenarios in which space vulnerabilities are worrisome.  
 125 
 
warfare.441 This is relevant, less because it exposes American vulnerability, but more because it 
demonstrates that U.S. policy makers are affected by prospect theory via the availability 
heuristic. The idea of a catastrophic surprise attack that threatens U.S. strategic interests is highly 
available to policy makers. They have categorized a prospective Chinese attack on U.S. space 
assets with 9/11 and Pearl Harbor, increasing their estimation that such an attack will occur due 
to representative association. The recent emphasis on space warfighting in U.S. policy circles 
serves the purpose of taking out probabilistic insurance aimed at reducing the probability of 
space war occurring or diminishing the effect if it does.442 Although Russia’s counterspace 
capability is arguably more robust than that of China, Russia is less often the target of alarmist 
thinking.443 This is due to three key aspects of Sino-U.S. relations that increase the availability of 
an adversarial relationship between China and the United States.  
e. Preemption Meets Deterrence 
Players primarily hypothesize their adversary’s course of action from history, anticipating 
that an opponent will follow a similar strategy to one they have implemented in the past.444 
Unfortunately, historical Sino-U.S. relations are fraught with misunderstanding and conflict. 
Fluctuating American power in the Pacific, due to economic cycles and other security 
commitments, has repeatedly resulted in China expressing self-determinism and expanded 
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sovereignty by testing American resolve. This is demonstrated by multiple Taiwan Strait crises 
and continual diplomatic rebalancing among China, Russia, and the United States.445 Recent 
Chinese rapprochement with Russia, as well as Chinese expansion in the East and South China 
Seas in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, gives the impression of this same pattern 
reemerging. China’s recent expansion in counterspace capabilities could be perceived as a part of 
a broader pushback against American hegemony, especially considering how integral space 
capabilities are to a regional conflict in East Asia.  
Similarly, Western intervention in Asia has repeatedly been met with unexpected hostility 
from China due to its fear of encirclement.  
When the Chinese view of preemption encounters the Western concept of deterrence, a 
vicious circle can result; acts conceived as defensive in China may be treated as 
aggressive by the outside world; deterrent moves by the West may be interpreted in 
China as encirclement. The United States and China wrestled with this dilemma 
repeatedly during the Cold War; to some extent they have not yet found a way to 
transcend it… [In the case of Korea] a Chinese offensive was a preemptive strategy 
against dangers that had not yet materialized and based on judgements about ultimate 
American purposes toward China that were misapprehended. 446 
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The assertion of American space superiority and the capability to deny China access to the 
domain can be seen as yet another aspect of strategic encirclement. This pattern makes it difficult 
to expect peaceful outcomes. Resentment of American bullying has led for some in China to call 
for it to consolidate gains and assert a claim to superpower status. On the other hand, 
misunderstanding of China’s active defense posture has strengthened the view within American 
policy circles that Sino-U.S. relations are zero-sum.447  
h. Cultural Differences  
War has a tendency to become ritualized when opponents share a common culture and/or 
civilization and are highly invested in international norms. The result is adequate signaling 
before an attack occurs, strict rules of engagement, and tactics that reduce collateral damage.448 
During the Cold War, strategic warfare between the U.S. and Russia became ritualized due to 
repeated crisis and diplomatic interaction. A system of mutual restraint in space emerged because 
space capabilities were inherently linked to treaty verification and early warning. However, due 
to conventional-strategic decoupling, no first-strike nuclear posture, and lack of firebreaks, no 
such system has emerged between China and the U.S.449 Disparate views on strategic deterrence 
and China’s unwillingness to conform to normative behavior further solidified the divide. As 
Mao famously stated “I’m not afraid of nuclear war. There are 2.7 billion people in the world; it 
doesn’t matter if some are killed. China has a population of 600 million; even if half of them are 
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killed, there are still 300 million people left.”450 Or, “If the worst came to the worst and half of 
mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and 
the whole world would become socialist; in a number of years there would be 2.7 billion people 
again and definitely more.”451 This sharply juxtaposes the nuclear taboo that developed between 
the U.S. and Soviet Union. 
i. Preconceptions 
Third, preconceptions limit imagination and empathy in ways that distort perception of 
threat. Unfortunately, preconceptions are generally oversimplified or overgeneralized lessons 
learned from a biased history.452 These lessons are cemented in an individual or collective 
conscious through confirmation bias.453 Therefore, cultural narrative is likely to alter threat 
perception by shaping availability. Strategic culture is the shared, culturally embedded social, 
economic, and political values and priorities of a society, relevant to security preferences, as 
historically shaped by successful interactions with and adaptations to their prevailing bio-
physical and strategic environment.454 Americans tend to view war in terms of crusades, fought 
on behalf of truth, justice, and the American way (democracy, freedom of the seas, and self-
determination); they fight wars for ideals rather than for an objective.455 Therefore, the goal for 
warfare tends to be the unconditional surrender and the overthrow of the adversary’s system of 
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government.456 This requires the overwhelming use of force and advanced technology to bring 
about swift and decisive victory.457 It inherently demands a worthy foe who deserves U.S. 
attention.  
The ideological roots of the United States’ China policy are firmly grounded in its vestigial 
understanding of China as a Communist threat from the Cold War era. American strategic 
interactions with China are often framed by China’s human rights record, domestic reform, and 
even régime change, especially in the wake of Tiananmen.458 Mistrust and suspicion 
characterizes American’s view of China, believing that the emergence of China may be a threat 
to world peace.459 This increases the availability of a Chinese challenge to the status quo; 
potentially causing U.S. policy makers to overestimate the risk of a Chinese challenge to 
American hegemony and/or misinterpreting Chinese signaling. The opaqueness of China’s 
decision-making apparatus and apparent internal debate as to what role China desires to play in 
the world further convolutes this dynamic. 
Why does it matter if scenarios involving an opponent’s defection are highly available? Fear 
and mistrust brought on by high availability of a catastrophic Cooperate/Defect scenario lead 
players to “buy” probabilistic insurance through increased readiness posture, the formation of 
alliances, and arms buildups. This, in turn, increases tension between the players, making it more 
                                                 
456 Thomas Mahnken, United States Strategic Culture, Course Material (Washington: Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 2006), 5-9. 
457 Mahnken, 11-14. For more on the Powell Doctrine and American casualty aversion see Savage Wars of 
Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power by Max Boot Chapters 14-15. The Powell Doctrine, steeped in 
the lessons of the Vietnam War, sought to fight a decisive battle with full U.S. military commitment, overturn the 
existing status quo, then leave before the U.S. could be engaged in a guerrilla conflict. It sought to prevent 
committing U.S. troops to struggles whose objectives were unclear or not completely vital to national security. Due 
to the complex 21st Century security environment, this is likely to be nearly unattainable.  
458 Kissinger, On China, 447-456. 
459 Johnson, “China's Strategic Clulture,” 1-2. 
 130 
 
difficult to build trust and see gains from mutual cooperation. Policy makers’ biases involving 
the other player’s hostile intentions are confirmed, further entrenching them in the decision-
making apparatus. This mechanism acts strongly in an offensive dominant environment.460 The 
players become trapped in the cyclical pattern of the security dilemma. In current Sino-U.S. 
relations, the danger of this self-fulfilling prophesy is exceptionally high due to the attention that 
Chinese policy makers pay to American doctrine, literature, and policy. This is especially true 
when U.S. policy makers make their suspicion of China public and tout the inevitability of a 
space war in the very near future.461 
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IV. Conclusion 
During the current tumultuous period of time, the creation of new modes of international order is 
inevitable. However, if the previously discussed pattern of separate arrangements devolves into 
many spheres of activity, competing world orders could come into existence. Should this be the 
case, one goal of coevolution would be to ensure that the United States and China pool efforts 
internationally to bring about an agreed world order. In the absence of common goals and agreed 
rules of restraint, institutionalized rivalry is likely to escalate beyond the calculation and 
intentions of its advocates. In an era in which unprecedented offensive capabilities and intrusive 
technologies multiply, the penalties of failure could be drastic and perhaps irrevocable.462 
The evolution of the world order does not necessarily require accommodating China’s rise at the 
expense of America’s influence in the Pacific, nor does it necessitate dividing into opposing 
power blocks (as was the case during the Cold War). Further, it does not require seeing the U.S. 
undermine China’s emergence through economic, social, and military means, and does not 
demand friendly cooperation between the U.S. and China. There is room for a competitive 
relationship that redefines the world order, while simultaneously preserving the shared core 
interests of both parties.463 Ultimately, the stability of mutual restraint is advantageous to the 
U.S. and China, therefore disarming the inherently unstable security dilemma present in Sino-
U.S. relations should be the primary concern of U.S. space policy. 
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The unstable equilibrium of the security dilemma can be dampened by shifting the Nash 
equilibrium from defection to cooperation for both players. This can be accomplished by altering 
the players’ utility in three ways: first, increase the benefit of mutual cooperation; second, 
decrease the benefit gained from a Defect/Cooperate outcome; third, reduce the cost of a 
Cooperate/Defect outcome. The security dilemma can also be dampened by making offensive 
and defensive postures distinguishable from one another, as well as creating an environment in 
which defense has the advantage over offense. These mechanisms operate by altering the 
players’ perception of the zero-sum nature of the game, thereby altering their utility of the 
Cooperate/Defect and Defect/Cooperate outcomes. Furthermore, revealing and accounting for 
cognitive biases allows for a more accurate perception of threat, reducing the probability that a 
player will view the other’s actions as harmful and ultimately increase the likelihood of 
cooperation. 
The weakness of the current space law régime has resulted in multiple efforts to develop a 
code of conduct or an arms control agreement for space for the purpose of limiting the 
proliferation of debris and protecting the continued use of the domain. However, these efforts 
have been held hostage by a China-U.S. strategic stalemate.464 On one side, China has 
demonstrated a heavy reliance on asymmetric anti-satellite warfare (primarily composed of 
kinetic direct-ascent and laser ASAT weapons) to supplement their A2/AD strategy in East Asia. 
Therefore, they have staunchly rejected any ban on terrestrial based or debris-causing ASAT 
weaponry. The PPWT, introduced jointly by Russia and China, failed to garner support from the 
United States because it did not limit the use of ground-based weapons, failed to introduce a 
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coherent definition of space weapons, and did not include a verification régime.465 This was seen 
by Washington as a blatant attempt to preserve China’s deterrent threat while removing a key 
U.S. military advantage. A resolution against “no first placement” of weapons in outer space 
further confirmed U.S. fears that the PPWT was aimed at reducing U.S. warfighting capability. 
In 2014, the European Union proposed the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space 
Activities (ICoC), but it failed to gain traction in the U.S. due to concerns that it would constrain 
space capabilities, including space-based missile defense interceptors and anti-satellite 
weapons.466 A cornerstone of U.S. policy is the avoidance of policy decisions that would limit 
the use of existing ASAT weapons against Chinese space systems during a regional conflict.467 
This is particularly true when taking into consideration that the concepts of space warfighting, 
space superiority, and space control are thoroughly integrated with national policy.468 
A. Policy Recommendations 
j. The U.S. military must reduce reliance on space.  
It is difficult to codify international norms involving space weaponization and free access to 
outer space when the two most influential actors have diametrically opposed strategic interests. 
China will likely block initiatives that reduce its own ability to utilize debris causing or terrestrial 
ASATs, while simultaneously attempting to limit conventional U.S. military advantage by 
pursuing a ban on space weapons. The United States, reluctant to block its path to potential space 
                                                 
465 Scott Pace, “Security in Space,” Space Policy 33 (2015), 52. 
466 Pace, 53. 
467 Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, 
U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016), 
44.  
468 Mark Hilborne, “China’s Rise in Space and US Policy Responses: A Collision Course?” Space Policy 29 
(2013), 125-126. 
 134 
 
dominance, is unlikely to support a definitive ban on space weaponization; yet, it is incentivized 
to create international norms that limit the creation of debris in outer space to protect its high-
value space assets.469 This dynamic is unlikely to change unless China’s space-based ASAT 
capability reaches operational maturity, thus reducing its reliance on direct ascent ASATs. 
Alternatively, China’s space capabilities may mature to the extent that they are symmetric with 
the United States, allowing for a system of implicit mutual restraint to develop.  
The U.S. and China are unlikely to come to an agreement until the structural security 
dilemma is addressed. To accomplish this, the United States must reduce the benefit that China 
gains from the continued development of debris causing anti-satellite weapons through a denial 
of gains strategy. The primary U.S. strategy must be to reduce its reliance on space by 
substituting terrestrial capabilities for space-based capabilities in its AirSea Battle (ASB) 
concept. This will reduce the role of space in the F2T2EA chain and devalue ASATs as a tactical 
and operational weapon. When Chinese strategists believe that the tactical value of direct ascent 
ASAT weapons are outweighed by the international stigma of their use, the U.S. may be able to 
gain traction in banning such weapons. It may be attractive for U.S. policy makers to pursue a 
denial of gains strategy by hardening U.S. space assets against attack because it allows for the 
continued reliance on space capabilities. However, this is not an economical strategy due to an 
unfavorable offense/defense balance.470  
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k. Reducing fear of U.S. space domination (Reduce fear of C/D) 
The dual-use of space technologies results in an inability to conduct offense/defense 
differentiation, and creates mistrust, misperceptions, and miscalculations that can undermine 
political and strategic stability involving the space domain.471 When offense/defense 
differentiation cannot be accomplished, developing acceptable norms of responsible behavior, if 
only to reveal benign intentions and ritualize conflict, is preferable to an attempt to identify and 
ban specific technologies and capabilities.472 Therefore, the United States should seek to 
introduce a series of top-down TCBMs that codify a space code of conduct, work toward a treaty 
that bans the testing and use of destructive methods against space objects, and increase 
transparency and trust in U.S. space policy. Collectively, these initiatives could alleviate the fear 
of U.S. space domination. 
The infrastructure for introducing TCBM to the international community is well established. 
The UNCOPUOS is the principal international forum for the development and codification of 
laws and principles governing activities in outer space.473 A set of Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines was endorsed by the UNCOPUOS in 2007; however, this set of guidelines was non-
binding and contained ambiguous language, such as: “avoid intentional destruction and other 
harmful activities,” rather than specifically banning debris-causing space weapons.474 A working 
group under the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee set forth guidelines for the long term 
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sustainability of space in 2016, but (like the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines) these were 
non-binding.475 The UN General Assembly adopted the non-binding Resolution 69/32 that 
advised against the first placement of weapons in space with 126 in favor, 4 against (including 
the United States), and 46 abstentions.476 These measures, introduced through UNCOPUOS and 
the Conference on Disarmament (CD) show that space we aponization and debris mitigation 
TCBMs have received adequate attention in the United Nations. The United States’ decision to 
remain aloof in these forums in the face of the international consensus will damage U.S. prestige, 
raise fear of space weaponization, and threaten its space leadership. 
The United States should work through the CD to provide an alternative to China and 
Russia’s PPWT proposal. This proposal should ban the testing and use of debris-causing ASAT 
weapons and include a definition of “debris-causing” that allows for minor satellite breakups. 
This would keep space free of massive debris causing incidents in the event of a conflict, while 
simultaneously allowing the continued development of counterspace capabilities. No binding 
resolution will be established without an agreement between China and the United States, but (as 
discussed previously) a misalignment of strategic interests makes that outcome unlikely. 
Therefore, the United States must be prepared to make substantial concessions in order to gain 
acceptance from China. A variety of concessions may induce Chinese ratification: first, the U.S. 
could include a sidecar that bans on-orbit force application technologies in order to assuage fears 
that the U.S. intends to expand its global strike capability through the deployment of space 
weapons; second, the U.S. could reconsider its position on an ABM prohibition; third, the U.S. 
could pursue a bilateral non-first use pledge with China; fourth, the U.S. could open up the ISS 
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program to China; and fifth, the U.S. could restructure ITAR regulations to increase interaction 
between Chinese and American commercial markets.  
In the absence of a formal treaty, the United States must nonetheless continue to work 
towards implementing TCBMs that seek to increase transparency, familiarity and clarity of 
intentions, and provide a basis for strengthening mutual trust building and confidence amongst 
states.477 Improving space situational awareness (SSA) through an international outreach effort is 
the ideal platform through which to accomplish these goals. SSA is vital to the long-term 
sustainability of the space environment because it helps mitigate natural environmental threats 
and identifies behavior that would be detrimental to responsible use and long-term 
sustainability.478 Therefore, SSA will be a foundational verification mechanism for potential 
treaties as well as an opportunity for cooperative trust building.479 SSA is generally made up of 
two components: space surveillance and tracking (SST) and space traffic management (STM). 
First, SST involves using ground-based and space-based optical sensors and radars in order to 
track, characterize, and analyze space objects. Second, STM utilizes SST data in order to ensure 
safe passage through the space environment.480 Both SST and STM require cooperative efforts to 
be successful. SST necessitates a diverse, geographically dispersed sensor network to provide 
timely, accurate data on objects in a wide array of orbits.481 A single nation is not able to provide 
the geographical coverage needed for a comprehensive SST network. STM requires agreed upon 
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standards of behavior to ensure spaceflight safety.482 There is currently no standardized regime 
for conducting the broad SSA mission in order to analyze and communicate threats to the space 
domain.483 This creates an opportunity for the U.S. to utilize its position of technical superiority 
in order to score a soft power coup by taking the lead in a global SSA initiative. 
The major obstacle to building an international SSA coalition is the military utility SST data, 
which can be used to reveal classified military capabilities and conduct ASAT targeting.484 The 
United States possesses the most comprehensive network of SST sensors and maintains a 
database of 20,000+ space objects.485 However, the U.S. military did not share this data until an 
Iridium satellite collided with a Russian military satellite, prompting the amendment of 10 
U.S.C. § 2274 to authorize the provision of SSA services if they were consistent with national 
security interests.486 After this event, the U.S. Strategic Command’s SSA sharing program grew 
exponentially, providing close approach notices to satellite owner operators and freely sharing 
SST data on its website.487 This was a good first step, but an increase in the quantity of SST 
sensors in the past decade has done little to bolster space traffic management efforts due to the 
disjointed nature of the data.488 As the space community attempts to consolidate SST data as part 
of a broader SSA régime, multiple nascent SST data sharing organizations show that a U.S. 
centric model is not guaranteed.489 The U.S. could put itself in a dangerous situation if it 
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attempts to control SST data for the purposes of military use; this could potentially result in 
having complete control over only a fraction of the SST market, while American commercial 
SST companies lose their competitive edge.490 
In order to leverage the proliferation of SST sensors, increased interest in orbital debris 
mitigation from the international community, and the extant U.S. technological advantage in 
SST, the U.S. needs to encourage a U.S. centric data sharing model. The first step in this process 
will be separating the SSA mission from its military origins. Space Policy Directive-3, National 
Space Traffic Management Policy, issued by President Trump on June 18, 2018, indicates that 
the White House intends to act in that manner. The space policy directive orders the U.S. 
government to do the following: pioneer new SST technologies, encourage the commercial SST 
market, create SST data interoperability, develop STM standards and best practices, improve 
U.S. domestic space object registry, and encourage SST data sharing. All this will be 
accomplished primarily by the Department of Commerce, reducing the role of the DoD in the 
SSA mission.491 SPD-3 is absolutely in line with the recommendations of this thesis.   
While the United States is attempting to build bridges in the international space community, 
it may be burning others at an equivalent rate. In order to reduce Chinese fear of U.S. space 
domination, American decision makers must be careful to avoid inflammatory and militaristic 
rhetoric. The groundwork for space warfighting was set by the George W. Bush administration 
on the heels of the Rumsfeld Commission’s “Space Pearl Harbor” warning. The 2006 U.S. 
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National Space Policy maintained the right to deny adversaries use of space if those capabilities 
are hostile to U.S. national interests.492 Note that the policy does not say “deny adversaries use 
of space if those capabilities are hostile to U.S. space assets,” which would infer a natural right to 
self-defense. Rather, the language of the space policy suggests that the U.S. has the right to 
interdict an adversary’s space capabilities if they provide space effects that are disadvantageous 
to national security. This is consistent with the militaristic vernacular in the United States Space 
Command Vision for 2020, which promises to provide full spectrum space dominance hinging on 
space control capabilities. The Vision for 2020 compares space to other warfighting domains 
(land, air, and sea) and asserts that during the early 21st century, space power will evolve into a 
separate and equal medium of warfare.493 This rhetoric, combined with technological 
developments during the Bush administration, made the prospect of U.S. space domination seem 
incipient to Chinese policy makers and reignited conversation about space weaponization.494 
The Obama Administration brought more moderate rhetoric by excluding inflammatory 
language in the 2010 National Space policy, recommending space arms control, suggesting 
TCBMs for space stability, as well as allowing Bush era technology programs expire.495 This 
policy was received very well in Asia, allowing the Obama administration to open high level 
strategic dialog about space cooperation with China and strengthen relations with East Asian 
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allies.496 However, inflammatory and militaristic rhetoric returned with the Trump 
administration. Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson and other top Air Force leaders 
resurrected the idea of space as a warfighting domain during testimony to Congress, saying that 
the Air Force needed to maintain its capability regardless of consensus on international norms.497 
In 2017 Air Force Space Command created the National Space Defense Center to integrate space 
capabilities and C2 methods in order to help conduct a space war.498 President Trump echoed 
that space is a war-fighting domain by signing the Space Policy Directive-4 on 19 February 
2019, which proposes the creation of a Space Force as the sixth branch of service.499 These 
reorganizations alone are not as inherently threatening or substantive as the weapons 
development programs pioneered during the early 2000s. However, the incendiary rhetoric that 
accompanied these reorganizations may have counteracted the potentially powerful TCBMs 
outlined in SPD 2-3. The White House should emphasize cooperative, collaborative space 
initiatives as part of future space policy directives, rather than set a course for unilateralist 
(America First) action.  
l. Pursue active cooperation. (Increase benefit of CC) 
The U.S. space community must pursue active cooperation with China in order to increase 
the potential benefit of a Cooperate/Cooperate outcome. Robust bilateral cooperation between 
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the U.S. and China could increase trust and transparency, as well as improve signaling by 
engendering repeated diplomatic and scientific interaction, increase interdependence by giving 
each country a stake in the success of the other’s space program, foster China’s interest in space 
sustainability, and give China and the United States insight into each other’s space program.500 
China could benefit by learning from a more technologically advanced partner, while the United 
States learns about the capabilities and organization of a traditionally opaque bureaucracy.501 
Collaboration may also have significant cost sharing benefits, especially considering that the ISS 
may be reaching end of life and funding is precarious.502 Additionally, active engagement with 
China on manned space exploration and deep space science may prevent the development of a 
China-led space station, which could solidify its diplomatic ties within Europe and East Asia.503 
For these reasons, increased cooperation with China has the potential to yield great results; 
however, U.S. decision makers must take care to avoid pitfalls of past space cooperation projects 
when crafting Sino-U.S. policy.504  
China has showed an openness to bilateral cooperation, particularly between NASA and the 
China National Space Administration (CNSA) regarding manned space exploration and space 
science.505 In 2006, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin and other top NASA officials toured 
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Chinese space facilities in a landmark visit on the invitation of Laiyan Sun, administrator of the 
CNSA.506 This event was followed shortly after by a second visit by NASA administrator 
Charles Bolden (Griffin’s successor) in 2010.507 Additionally, in October 2010, Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates and China’s Defense Minister Liang Guanglie emphasized the need for 
dialog about space security and bilateral TCBMs.508 This high level engagement could have 
marked a significant breakthrough in Sino-U.S. space relations, and been preceded by lower-
level technical discussions, had the U.S. Congress not passed Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 in 
2011, which banned NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with 
China.509 Current NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine and CNSA administrator Zhang Kejian 
discussed SSA and deep space exploration as potential areas of cooperation in 2018, but this was 
not followed up by technical discussion.510 
In order to foster cooperation between China and the United States, domestic reforms need to 
be made. First, NASA should be the focal point for Sino-U.S. space cooperation: Public Law 
112-55, Sec. 539 should immediately be repealed to allow for NASA-CNSA engagement. 
Likewise, long-awaited domestic export control reforms would need to take place in order to 
streamline scientific and technical exchange and prevent further legal barriers to cooperation.511 
Additionally, the U.S. must be prepared to make a long-term commitment to China-U.S. joint 
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projects to assuage the fear of American political volatility.512 After these steps have been 
accomplished, the U.S. should clarify that joint NASA-CNSA projects will only take place for 
programs that have been removed from military control.513 The delineation between military and 
civilian control may address U.S. domestic concerns about technology transfer and set a 
groundwork for civilian control of space programs in China, potentially weakening the security 
dilemma by alleviating part of the dual-use conundrum. 
B. Summary 
The confluence of current Sino-U.S. relations and the state of space technology creates a 
structural security dilemma: the United States is excessively reliant on space support to conduct 
military operations in East Asia, which incentivizes China to pursue the development of 
technological and tactical innovations to deprive the U.S. of its operational advantage. This 
development threatens the U.S.’s conventional deterrent threat in the region, undermining 
strategic relations with key East Asian allies. The U.S. lacks a symmetrical response to China’s 
ASAT threat and must develop other means of deterrence, increasing the likelihood of horizontal 
escalation. Simultaneously, the offense-dominance of the space domain results in the lack of 
first-strike stability. These factors increase the likelihood that space will serve as a flash-point for 
a regional conflict in East Asia, and attempts to mitigate this threat are unlikely to succeed due to 
the inherent dual-use of most space technologies. Cognitive biases further worsen this security 
dilemma. Furthermore, China’s historic “century of humiliation” and rising technonationalism 
explain its position of losses seeking gains, making Chinese decision makers more likely to take 
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over-weighted risk in order to overturn the existing status quo. Key cultural differences 
proliferate conflict between the U.S. and China, further altering leaders’ decision calculus and 
creating an opportunity for self-fulfilling prophesy. Despite this grim prescription, arms race and 
conflict between the two nations is not inevitable. The implementation of top-down TCBMs 
designed to build trust and transparency can direct both nations towards a globally optimal 
outcome. 
C. Further Research 
This analysis is by no means exhaustive. In some cases, dozens of peer reviewed sources 
were boiled down to a sentence or two for the sake of brevity and conciseness. For example, the 
interaction of space law and this international relations focused analysis was only examined at a 
surface level. In many cases, sweeping generalizations replaced the minutia on which a legal 
analysis often hinges. As a result, this analysis is more effective for understanding the structural 
dynamic of Sino-U.S. space policy, than it is presenting detailed proposals and recommendations 
that a space lawyer would consider actionable. However, it does explain why current proposals 
for changing the space law régime have failed to gain consensus from China, Russia, and the 
United States. Future research should incorporate the “lessons learned” from this analysis in an 
attempt to develop a space code of conduct that can garner the agreement of the major 
spacefaring powers.  
Also, it is clear from this analysis that establishing a threshold in order to distinguish between 
chicken and the security dilemma is vital to avoid uncontrollable escalation. Future research 
must attempt to establish a clearly defined escalation ladder for space warfighting. It must also 
find methods to conduct strategic messaging between the U.S. and China so that these new rules 
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of the game can be ritualized. In order to do this, the game theoretical framework must expand to 
account for a sequential game.  
Furthermore, it should be notable that two very important events were mentioned only 
superficially in this analysis; the U.S. withdrawal from the INF treaty and India’s ASAT 
demonstration, which both occurred in early 2019. An examination of the treaty withdrawal 
would be a natural topic for further research, because it has the potential to significantly upset 
the current strategic status quo; leading to increased regional tension, a realignment of strategic 
posture, the proliferation of nuclear material, and creating an opportunity for strategic 
miscalculation. These factors are fundamental to this analysis; therefore, an inevitable influx of 
new information will necessitate a reexamination of this topic within a very short time. Luckily, 
the current framework is adequate to account for this development. On the other hand, the Indian 
ASAT demonstration is a milestone event in the space law and policy world that will require an 
expansion in the scope of this analysis. The ASAT demonstration raises questions about the 
proliferation of ASAT technology and the rise of India as a major regional competitor. In order 
to account for this, the game theoretical framework would need to expand to include India, 
Japan, Russia, and possibly Europe as players. This expansion adds considerable computational 
complexity and ultimately uncertainty. 
As a parting statement: India’s ASAT test and the withdrawal from the INF treaty are 
indicative of a major strategic upheaval; an increasingly multi-polar world and strategic 
rebalance is coming faster than many anticipate. Rapid technological advances in spacelift, 
computing, and man-machine integration will impact the space domain in unpredictable ways. 
China remains opaque, but it is impossible to avoid the sense that Xi Jinping’s rise to power is 
the most significant event in China since Mao’s death. The complete collapse of the Chinese 
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economy and social structure, leading to global recession; a rapid Chinese expansion leading to 
regional conflict; a slow, peaceful Chinese usurpation of the U.S. led world order; or continued 
competitive, but peaceful coexistence between the U.S. and China are all equally likely 
outcomes. These trends were completely obvious with the benefit of hindsight, but what they 
mean for the future remains unclear. 
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